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I.

INTRODUCTION

The headline-grabbing business failures of late have brought
increased attention to the relatively unresolved area of multinational
bankruptcies. Parmalat, Global Crossing, and United Airlines are among
the few international juggernauts that have foundered. In the financial
meltdowns of these cross-border institutions, assets and creditors are
dispersed throughout commercial environments that rarely end neatly at
national borders. There has been heated debate, both in scholarly
literature and the practical battlefield, over how best to resolve these
transnational insolvencies, and there is nothing yet approaching a
consensus. Reform efforts of various stripes have almost uniformly
failed to gain meaningful international support.1
At the hub of this inability to generate international consensus is a
theoretical rift. The essence of disagreement revolves around the
competing theories of “territorialism” and “universalism” as the
1. Treaties proved unavailing. See Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global
Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 487 (1991)
(discussing the Strasbourg Convention and the failed Brussels Convention). So did other
attempts. See Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and
Beyond, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329 (1993) (discussing the challenges facing adoption of the
International Bar Association’s largely ignored Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act).
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preferred normative models for resolving multinational failures.2 While
territorialism counsels following strict sovereign borders in allocating
regulatory jurisdiction among nations over globally dispersed assets,3
universalism embraces a one-law approach: the application of one
“exporting” country’s law extraterritorially to other “receiving”
jurisdictions.4
Given that this theoretical debate between territorialism and
universalism remains ongoing and unresolved, we should be
unsurprised at the historic inability to craft an international agreement
among nations, by treaty or other means. Indeed, we should remain
pessimistic in our prognosis. Nevertheless, an important and fresh
development in international bankruptcy has recently defied our bearish
expectations. After decades of disagreement, one recent attempt at
reform has bucked the trend of failure and actually won widespread
international support: the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
(Model Law).5 Since the Model Law, there has been an explosion of
international bankruptcy reform.6 These efforts include UNCITRAL’s
best practices Draft Legislative Guide, designed for countries seeking to
revise their insolvency laws;7 the American Law Institute’s (ALI’s)
Transnational Insolvency Project (TIP), a series of proposals for crossborder insolvencies in the three NAFTA countries;8 and the European
2. See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law
Provisions, 33 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 119, 124 (1998) (characterizing universalism and territorialism as
“essentially rival schools of thought about the ‘correct’ way to govern transnational insolvency”).
See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Colloquy, International Bankruptcy: Resolving
Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000)
[hereinafter Colloquy] (discussing difficulties with both theories).
3. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 1, at 461.
5. U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL LAW].
6. See, e.g., Bob Wessels, The European Union Insolvency Regulation: An Overview with
Trans-Atlantic Elaborations, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 494 (William L.
Norton, Jr. ed., 2003) (describing the provisions and limitations of the recently adopted EU
Insolvency Regulation).
7. UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.54 (2001) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide].
8. AM. L. INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG NAFTA
COUNTRIES. INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES VOLUME (2003) [hereinafter ALI TIP], cited in Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational
Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, and The EU Insolvency
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Union’s Insolvency Regulation, a legal enactment covering intra–
European Union multinational bankruptcies.9 Accordingly, these recent
developments present something of a puzzle: why, in the face of so
many false starts, and especially in the face of ongoing disagreement
over the theoretical benefits of universalism compared to territorialism,
did international bankruptcy reform finally take off? Was it simply a
matter of fortuitous historical timing? Was there something specific
about the mechanism of the UNCITRAL Model Law (perhaps its status
as a model law, as opposed to a treaty, or perhaps its substantive
content) that accounted for its ability to break the loggerhead? What
makes a mechanism such as a model law effective at galvanizing reform
in international bankruptcy law?
This Article examines how international bankruptcy law changes. At
one level, its scope is thus restricted to the peculiarities of insolvency
law and its international challenges in particular. On another level,
however, the model builds upon insights from conflicts literature and
other theoretical tools of general applicability. What I am specifically
trying to do in this study of how bankruptcy law changes is explore and
explain what I call a “mechanism” of reform in international
bankruptcy. By this I mean looking at a specific product of international
bankruptcy reform—here the UNCITRAL Model Law—as a case study
of sorts. The goal is to see if it has distinguishing characteristics that can
explain its successful reception by the international community in an
environment, such as bankruptcy, where international consensus
remains elusive and mired in theoretical disagreement. Accordingly, I
situate this project on a middle ground between a substantive critique of
the universalism versus territorialism theories of international
insolvency law more generally on the one hand,10 and a process analysis
of international commercial law on the other.11 In focusing on a
mechanism of reform, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law (which has
just been enacted in the United States), I am thus trying to explain what
made one project work where other putative reform mechanisms
faltered. In doing so, I scrutinize both the substantive provisions of that
Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 41 n.109 (2002).
9. Council Regulation 1346/2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 000100013, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_160/l_16020000630en00010
018.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
10. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 775 (1999).
11. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999) (applying public choice analysis).
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mechanism and the process by which it was created. My result is a
theory of how international bankruptcy law can change most readily.
The principal contention of this Article is that international
bankruptcy reform mechanisms such as UNCITRAL’s Model Law
succeed due to a synergistic combination of specific attributes, the most
important of which are a modesty of scope and a procedural focus. By
adopting an incrementalist and procedurally animated approach (what I
call “procedural incrementalism” as a shorthand), the Model Law
created an opportunity to bridge the theoretical gap between
universalists and territorialists. This was accomplished obliquely: on the
surface, the Model Law bridged it by appearing to be a hybrid of
universalism and territorialism, with something seemingly for everyone.
Beneath the surface, however, the Model Law actually advanced
universalism, and in a way that caused minimal affront to territorialist
jurisdictions. The Model Law’s design thus allowed hesitant states to
“acclimate” to a regime of universalism. This is the genius of the Model
Law and makes it unprecedented in its effectiveness as a mechanism of
international reform. Following years of failure in an environment
where the comparative merits of territorialism and universalism remain
hotly contested, the Model Law actually won support.
To make this claim, I must first lay several foundations, which
naturally divides the Article into five sections. Section II sets the
theoretical stage and outlines the continuing debate between
universalism and territorialism. This is important in order to articulate
the principles of universalism that are likely to be the sticking points for
territorialists. Sections III and IV then explore UNCITRAL’s Model
Law. Rather than conduct a clause-by-clause exegesis,12 Section III (the
“surface” analysis) sketches a broad outline of how the Model Law
seemingly operates vis-à-vis the theoretical debate presented in Section
I. Section IV (the “subsurface” analysis) then explores several specific
provisions of the Model Law in detail that operate more toward its
periphery and belie its true location along the universalism axis.
Building upon this scrutiny, Section V proposes a model for how the
Model Law achieved its important advancements, namely, widespread
international support and the partial acceptance of universalism,
notwithstanding the ongoing disagreement presented in Section II. It
12. This task has been conducted commendably elsewhere. See, e.g., Andre J. Berends, The
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 309 (1998).
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uses some insights of modern conflicts literature and contends that the
Model Law’s success lies not simply in its status as a model law, but
from its attention to “low stakes,” modest matters and concomitant
focus on procedural issues. This procedural incrementalism holds the
key to its effectiveness as a mechanism of reform. Finally, Section VI
tentatively tests the model’s consistency with subsequent reform efforts
that have followed upon the Model Law in bankruptcy.

II.

THE TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY DEBATE

In this Section, I sketch in broad strokes the outline of the theoretical
debate regarding transnational insolvencies. I begin with the unique
theoretical elements of domestic insolvency laws that only intensify in
complexity at the international level.

A.

Insolvency Law Generally

There are at least four key features of a domestic insolvency system.
First, a domestic insolvency system generally strives to be “market
symmetric,” i.e., co-extensive with an entire domestic economy’s
scope.13 Thus, in a federal system such as the United States, one
bankruptcy law operates at the federal level, superseding and hence
unifying the laws of the several states. Accordingly, although property
liens and contractual rights might be defined locally, the reordering of
those rights to deal with general financial default occurs federally.14
Second, and relatedly, bankruptcy has been characterized as “metalaw” that swoops in and trumps pre-existing legal entitlements in a
specifically defined context: when an entity experiences general
financial default.15 Accordingly, bankruptcy laws run “deep” and have
the tendency to get in the way of and displace other laws and policies in
the domestic system. The list of the activities exempted from the scope
of the bankruptcy stay under American law is narrow.16
Third, when a debtor enters the bankruptcy system, the nature of the
legal proceeding is in rem. In other words, if one of the principal
13. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH L. REV.
2276, 2283–84 (2000).
14. See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 227, 236–41 (2000).
15. See Frederick Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 555, 566–68 (2001) (attributing the term “meta-law” to Manfred Balz, The
European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (1996)).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2000).
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functions of an insolvency system is to distribute or reorganize the
assets of a debtor, then all the stakeholders must be bound by the
proceeding’s outcome.17 Consequently, it is difficult to consider the
bankruptcy of an enterprise without also considering the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy system’s legal institutions to bind all the participants in
property-based actions.18 This “breadth” of bankruptcy law is
theoretically derived, in part, from its need to protect creditors from
their potentially value-destructive impulses. Bankruptcy marshals
creditors together in a compulsory dispute resolution process; no one
gets to opt out.19
Fourth, the key substantive elements of an insolvency regime can be
summarized as rules of priority and distribution,20 and, to a lesser extent,
the related rules of avoidance.21 These rules are “prickly” because they
are highly normative and driven by domestic policy.22 As one country’s
top court summarized, “[n]ational bankruptcy laws express the policies
and priorities of their enacting countries.”23 Therefore, although at a
general level all bankruptcy regimes might find themselves aligned in
overarching goals, such as “protection and maximization of the value of
17. The in rem nature of bankruptcy law and its need to bind all participants is underscored in
the federalist system of the United States by bankruptcy’s in rem abrogation of the sovereign
immunity of states. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood (In re
Hood), 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
18. See Westbrook, supra note 1.
19. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 12–13 (1986).
20. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 234 (2004).
This characterization implicitly assumes that bankruptcy law—at least part of it—may be called
“substantive.” Others may disagree, but I am willing to classify both the distributive decision of
who gets what when a debtor cannot satisfy all of its creditors and the extinguishment of legal
debts “substantive” by whatever criterion one might use. To the extent that bankruptcy law
contains both substantive elements and procedural elements, I contend that priority rules lie at the
substantive end of the spectrum. I therefore refer to these elements throughout this paper as
“substantive” bankruptcy law.
21. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499, 500 (1991) (noting that avoidance laws “have as their function the
protection and vindication of the priorities set by each national distribution scheme”). The
different policies of avoidance law clashed in one of the seminal transnational insolvency cases,
In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 186 B.R. 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036, 1042 (2d Cir. 1996).
22. Some scholars argue that these normative matters of distributive justice are ill-situated in
bankruptcy law. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
580–88 (1998) (discussing academic debate). Even those tolerant of such provisions urge caution.
See Westbrook, supra note 21, at 510 (observing that each country’s priority and avoidance laws
must balance statutory entitlements against the costs and risks of unsettling otherwise normal
commercial transactions).
23. Antwerp Bulkcarriers, N.V. v. Holt Cargo Sys., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 951, 964 (Can.).
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[a] debtor’s assets,”24 consensus dissolves soon after that. The more
specific provisions of domestic insolvency laws reflect an array of
normative value judgments, such as which creditors should be accorded
priority and how strongly secured credit requires protection.25 Some
consider these distributive provisions important vindications of social
policy;26 others deem them the spoils of “domestic rent seeking
contests.”27 Whatever the view, these laws are “public and regulatory.”28
Accordingly, perhaps the most challenging substantive consequence of
domestic bankruptcy laws are their varying distributive policy
determinations of who should bear the most pain in a situation in which,
by definition, a debtor has insufficient funds to satisfy all creditors
fully.29
In sum, bankruptcy laws are broad, deep, and prickly. They are
expansive, both in terms of encompassing all of a debtor’s assets and in
terms of displacing other domestic substantive laws in the event of
financial crisis.30 They are also policy-laden and distributive,
determining which creditors warrant special treatment in distribution.
To be maximally effective, bankruptcy laws must bind as many
stakeholders in the debtor’s assets as possible, commensurate with the
debtor’s commercial market. Given this invasive character of a law that
tends to contain deep normative content and that varies substantially
jurisdiction by jurisdiction, a greater recipe for an international conflict
of laws in the cross-border setting might be difficult to imagine.
24. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, pmbl.
25. Professor Guzman examines employee priorities and finds that the seeming divergence
across jurisdictions may actually be overstated. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In
Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2197–98 (2000) (canvassing different
countries’ employee priority laws). Professor Tung, however, notes that labor seems to have
heightened lobbying power (and thus heightened bankruptcy priority) in Germany, France,
Mexico, and South Korea. See Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests:
Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law, 3 CHI.
J. INT’L. L. 369, 375–76 (2002).
26. See WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND
CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS ¶ 148 (2001) [hereinafter WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES] (“Legislators
should…create…priority classes based on…widely embraced social policies.”).
27. Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 31, 55
(2001).
28. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 123.
29. See Bob Wessels, Current Developments Towards International Insolvencies in Europe,
13 INT. INSOLV. REV. 43, 46 (2004) (“Even the more recent European insolvency laws continue
to show substantial differences in underlying policy considerations, both in structure and in
content.”).
30. This is especially so in the reorganization context. See Stonington Partners, Inc. v.
Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., 310 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2002).
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The International Perspective

An increasing number of businesses have begun to transcend national
boundaries in recent decades.31 When a transnational firm encounters
financial crisis, it thus presumptively engages the regulatory scope of
more than one country’s bankruptcy regime. This presents a classic
conflict of laws situation, replete with the traditional choice-of-law
concerns. Of particular interest are the legitimacy of the extraterritorial
reach of one country’s laws to govern the distribution of assets located
in another jurisdiction, the actual or constructive expectations of
stakeholders regarding the applicable laws, and the balance between
comity and the assertion of sovereign entitlement.32
Conflicts in bankruptcy situations are inevitable due to the expansive
reach of the laws. They are also prickly, due to the policy-rich norms
implicated. The theoretical possibilities for resolution are therefore
numerous. For example, one might argue that because a debtor firm is
more closely tied to Country A, Country A’s bankruptcy laws should
govern, even with regard to assets located in Country B.33 On the other
hand, one might well say that as co-equal sovereigns, neither Country A
nor Country B has a greater claim to govern the assets in the other’s
jurisdiction.34 Or one might take an entirely different approach and
argue that both countries’ assets should be governed by an external,

31. There remains empirical disagreement over whether the exemplar multinational is a
mega-conglomerate or a smaller firm located near a border. See Kent Anderson, The CrossBorder Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal Approach Considering the
Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 771 (2000) (describing Japanese
pachinko parlors owned by Koreans). Professor Westbrook laments these smaller firms as
“invisible to scholarship.” Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2532 n.5 (1996).
32. See generally Westbrook, supra note 21. The Supreme Court has recently chastised
overstepping regulatory bounds when dealing with solely domestic antitrust matters. See F.
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2367 (2004) (“Why should
American law supplant, for example, Canada’s, or Great Britain’s or Japan’s own determination
about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive
conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign
companies?”).
33. See, e.g., MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 2 (proposing “centre of…main interests” test).
34. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1019 (1991) (“The whole
problem in a true conflict is that different states have made different judgments about what is just,
and it is axiomatic that…states are coequal sovereigns entitled to make their own value
judgments.”).
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substantive law created by some form of international agreement.35 A
rich theoretical literature explores the possibilities.
In a critical respect, the “problem” of transnational insolvencies, at
least at one level, might be nothing more than an admittedly challenging
choice-of-law issue: whose (policy-rich) laws of distribution, priority,
and avoidance should govern the insolvency of the multi-jurisdiction
debtor? One response, accordingly, might be to craft a uniform
jurisdiction-selecting protocol based on contacts.36 Another approach,
following more modern conflicts literature, might seek to find which of
a competing set of rules better forwards more abstracted values, such as
an efficient international commercial system.37 I refer to both of these
types of solutions as “pluralist,” because they countenance the validity
of myriad bankruptcy regimes around the world, each of which could
legitimately govern a given cross-border insolvency. Therefore
substantive harmonization of these various regimes, at least initially,
appears unnecessary.
To be sure, pluralism is not the only theoretical paradigm available to
address cross-border insolvency, but it remains dominant. In so doing,
pluralism has splintered into two primary theoretical models:
territorialism and universalism.38

C.

The Tradition: Territorialism

Finding its roots in the choice-of-law situs rule,39 the traditional
approach to transnational bankruptcy has been one of “territorialism.”
Country A insolvency proceedings may only reach assets located in
35. Cf. Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1, 22–27 (1997) (proposing opt-out rights from default legislative rules for privately
contracting commercial actors).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c (1971) (articulating the
principle that the law of the jurisdiction with the “most significant relationship” to a dispute
should govern).
37. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990); see also
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law
Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 23, 30 (2000) (speculating on the potential for
transnational bankruptcy to move from jurisdictional fixation to content-based rules).
38. Professor Rasmussen’s alternative of maximal private ordering (“contractualism”) is an
important contribution to this robust academic discussion but beyond the scope of this Article’s
focus. See generally Colloquy, supra note 2 (discussing efficacy of contractual solutions to
transnational insolvencies).
39. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 223, 226, 228, 234–36,
239, 241 (1971). That the situs rule is well followed does not, of course, mean that it is well
received. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, An Inquiry Into the Utility of “Situs” as a Concept in
Conflicts Analysis, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 11 (1966).
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Country A. To the extent a debtor has assets in Country B, only Country
B’s courts—applying Country B’s bankruptcy laws—may govern them.
Good jurisdictional borders make for good neighbors in international
regulatory relations, and there is always the backdrop of comity.
This system, while arguably clear, proves cumbersome when
implemented. Bankruptcy proceedings can be opened in multiple
countries covering various assets with the only hope of coordination
coming from principles of comity.40 Complicating matters further, some
countries, such as the United States, assert broad jurisdiction over a
debtor’s worldwide assets,41 in essence inviting a conflict of laws
regarding the assets located abroad. At the other end of the spectrum,
countries like South Korea42 and the Netherlands43 sharply constrain the
scope of their own bankruptcy proceedings to domestic assets. In the
latter group of countries, foreign orders seeking to affect domestic
assets—such as might be generated in an American bankruptcy
proceeding—are rendered void if challenged domestically. An
international debtor with assets in multiple jurisdictions is thus exposed
to an array of potentially conflicting bankruptcy laws, such as Dutch
and French law applying to Dutch-situated assets of a French-domiciled
debtor in bankruptcy in one or both countries.44

40. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
42. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 729–34. See Samuel L. Bufford & Kasuhiro Yanagida,
Japan’s New Laws on Business Reorganization: An Analysis, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 59 n.353
(2005) (discussing Daewoo Motor Bankruptcy proceedings in Korea and Japan). I have been
advised by e-mail from Benjamin Wagner, research assistant to Professor Soogeum Oh of Ewha
Womans University in Seoul, Korea, that as of March 2005, South Korea has amended its
insolvency laws (to take effect March 2006), which will add a cross-border insolvency section
“modeled largely after the UNCITRAL Model Law.”
43. See Berends, supra note 12, at 315. Japan has recently amended its laws to drop its
territorialist approach. See Bufford & Yanagida, supra note 42; see also Bob Wessels, The
Comity Principle in Amice, LIBER AMICORUM ROB RUTGERS, KLUWER, DEVENTER, 347–59
(2005) (arguing that the principle of territoriality is being diminished under Dutch private
international law, but acknowledging a difference of scholarly opinion within the Netherlands);
Sumant Batra, Indian Insolvency Reforms: An Update, Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform, 6
(2004), available at http://www.insol.org (lamenting the failure of Indian legislative reforms to
depart from territorialism as proposed by the Eradi Committee).
44. See C./De Vleeschmeesters B.V., HR 31 mei 1996, NJ 108 (ann. ThMdB) (refusing to
recognize French discharge of the debtor and allowing Dutch proceedings to be opened because,
under Dutch law, French discharge could not affect Dutch claims or assets). For an English
description of the case, see Discharging a Bankruptcy in France and the Recovery of an
Undischarged Claim Against a Debtor in the Netherlands, 43 N.I.L.R. 390, 390–92 (1996).
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Even with crisp respect for jurisdictional boundaries, territorialism
has problems. Such a system encourages creditors to race to file local
bankruptcy proceedings at the first signs of distress—“grabbing” local
assets—and to distribute them quickly under local law before they can
leave the jurisdiction. The internationally dispersed assets of the
multinational debtor are thus divided and conquered under multiple
proceedings without any semblance of coherent, enterprise-wide
adjudication.45 This undermines the very market-symmetric and orderly
disposition of a debtor’s assets that is one of the theoretical foundations
of domestic insolvency regimes. In fact, it maximizes the chances of a
fractious resolution. Accordingly, as lamented by some scholars, a
lender trying to measure financial risk and to price credit to
multinational debtors faces an unenviable (and costly) task of predicting
how many of its debtor’s assets will be located in different jurisdictions
around the world—and for how long—and what the substantive
insolvency rules of each such jurisdiction will be in the event a debtor
defaults.46
Who then supports territorialism? Presumably not rationally acting
multinational businesses, who want to avoid the above-postulated
uncertainty cost and its concomitant increase in ex ante capital pricing.
Nor would we expect support from international lenders (other than
those who can price adjust perfectly). But territorialism does have
proponents. Supporters are drawn from two main camps. First, there
may be debtors or lenders who simply doubt that territorialism wreaks
havoc for multijurisdictional insolvencies. These skeptics may believe
that the unfailing clarity of territorialism’s allocation of regulatory
jurisdiction outweighs any increased costs of monitoring imposed by the
potential application of multiple bankruptcy laws.47 Second, the model
45. In corporate regulation, Philip Blumberg has contrasted an “enterprise” approach with an
“entity” approach in addressing multinational business entities. See Philip I. Blumberg, THE
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW, 63, 89 (1993). The “enterprise” approach
corresponds in the bankruptcy context with universalism and accords with bankruptcy law’s
preference for market-symmetric administration.
46. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 17–18. A further possible cost of territorialism is
that it skews investment toward suboptimal decisions by inclining a debtor to seek credit based
not only on expected financial return, but also on comparatively favorable priority treatment for
subsequent creditors under bankruptcy law (thus sharing the rent with the subsequent creditors
and transferring the costs onto subsidizing preexisting creditors). See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra
note 10, at 779. This argument has been challenged by others. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 8,
at 16; see also LoPucki, supra note 3, at 708 n.56 (citing the example of Nestlé’s international
financing discussed in Alan C. Shapiro, MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 767–69 (5th
ed. 1996)).
47. See LoPucki, supra note 3.
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finds support among sovereigntists, especially nations concerned that
they may have to subordinate their own bankruptcy laws and policies
under a one-law approach.48 These jurisdictions enjoy the certainty of
knowing their own laws will apply to at least the local assets within
their territorial borders. To be sure, there are other related issues,
including worries of hegemony,49 creditor endowments,50 and “vested”
property rights.51 The chief concern, however, seems to be a deep-seated
sense of sovereign entitlement animated by a reluctance to apply foreign
bankruptcy law to domestic assets and claimants.52

D.

The Promised Land: Universalism

Many bankruptcy theorists disfavor the potential chaos of multiple
bankruptcy laws governing a cross-border proceeding. Accordingly, the
dominant theory of an ideal international insolvency regime,
“universalism,” advocates one law to control a bankrupt’s worldwide
assets, regardless of their location. Universalists contend that such
uniformity will reduce the confusion associated with territorialism’s
competing domestic priority rules,53 reduce monitoring costs incurred by
lenders otherwise forced to police asset location constantly,54 enhance
overall asset value, and minimize administrative difficulties.55 Professor
Westbrook aggregates these predicted benefits under the label of
“Transactional Gain.”56 He posits that Transactional Gain creates a
much bigger pie to be distributed for all creditors. To entice creditors
48. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency Law as Credit
Enhancement: Insolvency-Related Provisions of the Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft
Equipment Protocol, 13 INT. INSOLV. REV. 27 n.106 (2004); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and
Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 8–9 & 12 n.22 (2003) (“Countries may object to
having the law of another country apply within their territory as a matter of sovereignty, even if
they agree with the policy of the law in question.”).
49. See Tung, supra note 15, at 576–77.
50. See infra Westbrook, note 72.
51. See Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Containerline N.V. (Trustees of), [2001] S.C.R. 907,
¶ 33.
52. Professor Fletcher summarizes this well when he candidly discusses the need for
international bankruptcy reform efforts to “appease” the powerfully held “base, national instincts”
of policy-defensive sovereign states. Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 119, 124 (1998).
53. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 462.
54. See Guzman, supra note 25, at 2179–81.
55. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2292–93.
56. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 466.
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who might enjoy a higher ratio of domestic assets covering domestic
claims than the worldwide average (and who would thus rationally
prefer to grab those assets under a territorialist system rather than share
them on a global level under one law), Westbrook anticipates a “Rough
Wash,” whereby such creditors are cautioned ex ante that they are
equally likely to find themselves in a “deficit” bankruptcy, where the
local assets to local claims ratio is lower than the global average and
hence there is less to grab, as they are to be in a “surplus” situation.57
Universalism tells these creditors that while its regime might change the
size of their pieces from bankruptcy to bankruptcy, the overall pie is
enhanced by Transactional Gain and the potentially differing size of
those pieces is likely to be a Rough Wash.58
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the
harmonization of one worldwide, substantive law of bankruptcy.59 The
most common model of universalism, however, follows a pluralist
route. Sidestepping the issue of which substantive provisions the ideal
bankruptcy law would possess, it simply selects from one of the preexisting bankruptcy regimes ex post.60 To the extent that other courts are
needed (to give legal force to the orders of the courts of the governing
jurisdiction), such courts could convene ancillary proceedings designed
to effectuate the controlling court’s orders.61 The current universalist
paradigm thus concedes the divergence of present domestic bankruptcy
laws and advocates only a pluralist system of choice-of-law; its theory
does not envision (or rely upon) substantive harmonization of those
bankruptcy laws.62
57. Id. at 471.
58. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 40 (“Thus the loss in today’s case will be an investment in
larger returns in future cases, on top of the general transactional gain that will arise from
multinational cooperation.”) (footnote omitted). A more aggressively utilitarian version of this
argument might be that even if some subgroup of local creditors is routinely and systematically
disadvantaged under universalism, the majority of local creditors enjoy sufficient rough wash to
make the transactional gain of universalism worthwhile: a “Kaldor-Hicks wash” so to speak.
59. See Colloquy, supra note 2 (referring to “substantive universalism”). Others have used the
term “unity” to refer to one forum governing an entire insolvency proceeding (which presumably,
but not necessarily, would be applying one substantive bankruptcy law). See Berends, supra note
12, at 315–16.
60. I refer to this model as “pluralist universalism.” In a recent article, Professor Westbrook
summarizes at least four templates for universalism, including single or multiple fora, applying
single or multiple laws. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2315–19.
61. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1978), discussed infra at 18. Local proceedings in cross-border
insolvencies may either be “ancillary” (assisting a primary jurisdiction) or “plenary” (rivaling one
and insisting on parallel jurisdiction).
62. Professor Avi-Yonah offers an elegant model of when transnational legal regimes should
aspire toward a pluralist, extraterritorialist path (as advocated by the universalists) and when

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art36

14

Pottow:

2005]

A M ODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY

949

The choice-of-law rule most commonly proposed to operationalize
universalism involves a content-neutral designation of “home court”
based on contacts with the debtor.63 Thus each country, at least in
theory, is equally entitled to be the controlling jurisdiction in a
transnational dispute. For example, if the choice-of-law rule for
determining the controlling jurisdiction is the place of the debtor’s
incorporation, then universalism implicitly assumes that for each
Country A-incorporated firm holding assets in Countries A and B, there
is probably an equal and opposite Country B-incorporated firm holding
assets in Countries B and A. This secondary order of “Rough Wash”
makes states in a universalist bankruptcy willing to subordinate the
application of their bankruptcy laws in favor of the primary
jurisdiction’s on the theory that they, in turn, will another day be the
primary jurisdiction entitled to deference from other states.64
instead they should seek substantive harmonization of domestic laws (in a cooperative spirit of
comity) for instances such as bankruptcy that ideally require enterprise-wide adjudication under
one substantive law. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 48, at 7–13, 20–23 & 31. Avi-Yonah aligns with
the universalists in deciding that bankruptcy requires an enterprise approach. He contends that
territorialists accept implicitly that resolution by one law is desirable but advocate territorialism
because the pragmatic forces of the substantive and normative differences among bankruptcy
laws make states unlikely to accept universalism. See id. at 20–23. In a sense he is correct, but I
think it is not so much that the universalists ignore or downplay the normative differences
between bankruptcy laws, rather that they are more optimistic for the capacity of states that hold
these different laws to appreciate the offsetting benefits of Transactional Gain inherent in
enterprise-wide resolution. Moreover, “modified” universalism, discussed below, recognizes the
need for an element of harmonization, which bleeds into another cell of Avi-Yonah’s theoretical
matrix. I am not sure the international consensus is as yet so strong toward universalism as AviYonah’s analysis might suggest, because I think different countries ascribe differing levels of
disutility to the acceptance of outcome differences, although this is a dynamic situation in flux to
be sure.
63. See, e.g., MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts. 2, 16(3). A “contacts” rule is not the only tool
universalism could use. For example, a first-to-file rule would accord equal if not greater
predictability at determining the primary jurisdiction to govern the global insolvency. Some
criticize a “home country” rule on the basis that countries anticipating they are likely to be homes
to multinationals (such as the United States) will disproportionately export their bankruptcy laws
to countries (such as Eritrea) that are less likely to be homes and hence likely to be net importers
of bankruptcy policy under universalism. Engagement of this point is beyond the scope of this
Article, but I note that Eritrea has adopted the Model Law. See Ian Fletcher, Update on INSOL
Model Law, International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals,
available at http://www.insol.org/newinsolworld/jul99/jul99uml.html.
64. See, e.g., Colloquy, supra note 2, at 2274 (“In a universalist regime, one country’s law
will govern, but the other countries have no basis for complaining—their law will govern in other
situations….”). Universalists have not always made this implicit assumption clear, although it
seems lurking in their writings. For example, the premise seems inherent in Westbrook’s notion
of “critical-mass reciprocity.” See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 467. Absent an assumption of even
distribution of jurisdictional primacy, it would be less likely for rational states to participate, let
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Almost as strong as the academic support for universalism as the
ideal and most efficient method of dealing with a transnational financial
default is the consensus that it is largely impractical at present.65 No
treaty exists or has even been seriously proposed to support such a
system, which would, among other things, rest strongly upon a
realistically enforceable choice-of-law provision. Indeed, at least one
scholar has argued (using game theory modeling and international
relations ideas) that universalism is likely impossible given rationally
acting states interacting with counterparts over repeated bankruptcy
“events.”66 Despite this gloominess,67 however, many theorists agree
alone reciprocate, in a universalist system, assuming they have an interest in seeing their own
laws govern disputes within their jurisdictions. Cf. id. at 425 n.26 (recognizing creditors in states
who predict that they would routinely end up with a higher territorial assets to territorial claims
ratio than the worldwide average would likely chafe against universalism). The premise might
also be part of Westbrook’s overarching theme of “rough justice.” See id. at 458.
Professor Tung chastises universalists for not making the assumption of even distribution of
jurisdictional primacy (and hence equal ex ante disposition by states toward universalist
cooperation) more transparent. FREDERICK TUNG, SKEPTICISM ABOUT UNIVERSALISM:
INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 29 n.93 (Berkeley L. & Econ.
Working Papers: Vol. 2001: No. 1, art. 7), available at http://www.bepress.com/blewp/default/
vol2001/iss1/art7. He also challenges the assumption itself as “counterfactual for many states.”
Id. at 24. For example, referring to a “home country” choice-of-law rule, Tung notes that under
universalism, less developed countries would routinely find themselves deferring to the industrial
country housing a multinational debtor’s headquarters. See id. at 29 n.93. For the purposes of this
Article, Tung adopts a “responding” assumption of universalism to this argument: that the model
of transnational insolvency only works for “countries with significant commercial relations and
for whom mutual advantage from universalist cooperation would seem to exist.” Id. at 30 n.93; cf.
Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2298–99 (suggesting that universalism might apply only to
companies of a certain size or certain economic activity, which might eschew the need for even
distribution of jurisdictional primacy by convincing deficit states that they are not forfeiting
significant sovereignty by routinely deferring). This is an ongoing question beyond the scope of
this Article, but the reader, again, is encouraged to reflect upon Eritrea’s enactment of the Model
Law.
65. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2283–94.
66. See Tung, supra note 64, at 24–31. Professor Tung notes that even states committed to
universalism would have a hard time confronting the inherent prisoner’s dilemma for the ancillary
domestic jurisdiction, which must trust in the cooperative future cession of sovereignty by the
foreign jurisdiction when the dominant position reverses. He argues that the fuzzy nature of
cooperation in universalism (specifically in modified universalism, discussed infra) and difficulty
in transparently communicating cooperation messages in the international arena set the stage for a
highly noisy and error-prone game play environment. See id. Additionally, judges have their own
agenda of interest to public choice scholars that might well undermine international cooperation
even when their respective countries are so inclined. See Erin A. O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein,
From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1158–60 (2000).
67. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, The Washington University Interdisciplinary Conference on
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Theory: Some Gloomy Thoughts on Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 936 (1994) (likening substantial international cooperation to the probability
that pigs could learn to fly).
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that universalism is a desirable ultimate goal toward which international
commercial law reform should strive. Indeed, it seems safe to say that
the majority view, at least among academic circles, is that universalism
is normatively superior as an efficient and fair model to resolve crossborder defaults, notwithstanding the ongoing preference for
territorialism among many country’s policymakers.68 Practice does not
appear yet to follow theory.
A critical problem that universalism faces (assuming a workable
choice-of-law rule can be designed)69 stems from the ongoing allure of
territorialism to sovereignty-conscious states. Many states will be happy
to apply their own bankruptcy laws broadly to the resolution of an
international dispute, but few want to cede their sovereignty over the
same dispute when they are deemed to be in the ancillary position. This
returns to the distinguishing characteristics of a bankruptcy regime
described above. When one state cedes jurisdiction to another to
facilitate a market-wide resolution of the default, it must fully subjugate
its broad-reaching, deep-cutting, and policy-rich bankruptcy laws to
those of the controlling state.70 This is a hard pill to swallow. It is very
difficult for a court in Country B to tell a group of Country B employees
who have worked in a branch office in Country B for years that they
will not enjoy the special priority distribution rule accorded to workers
under Country B’s bankruptcy laws, even though there are plentiful
assets in Country B to cover such a payout, because their employer’s
bankruptcy will be governed under the laws of Country A, which grants
no such priority.71 As Professor LoPucki muses:
Could the [foreign bankruptcy] court void an otherwise valid
collective bargaining agreement? Relieve the debtor of the
burdensome effects of environmental laws? Suspend the payment
68. See Tung, supra note 27, at 32–23.
69. That in itself is no mean feat. Choice of law rules are “notoriously imprecise and
indeterminate.” Tung, supra note 27, at 65 (citing Michael Whincorp, The Recognition Scene:
Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416, 427–
28 (1999) (contending that the reason international recognition of judgments is not predicated
upon choice of law rules is because of these rules’ inherent indeterminacy)).
70. See id. at 45–48 (suggesting that attempts to harmonize insolvency law must overcome
cultural differences and divergent legal codes).
71. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 711 (“Yet in a universalist system, the priority of Mexican
workers’ employment claims against a U.S. firm operating in Mexico would be determined by
U.S. rules of priority—much to the disappointment of the affected Mexican workers.”). Professor
Westbrook also has concerns for such local creditors. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 489
(suggesting exemptions from universalism for tort victims and consumers).
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of pensions to retired workers? Risk the pension fund in a
reorganization attempt? Delete from a shopping center lease
provisions restricting the purposes for which the debtor-lessee
can use the premises?72
Thus the theoretical core of universalism, in its pluralist mode, must
confront two fundamental challenges. The first is the design of a viable
choice-of-law rule that subscribing nations will agree to and honor. The
second is what Professor Westbrook calls the “acceptance of outcome
differences,”73 that is, the commitment of rationally selfish states—
which generally prefer to see their own substantive bankruptcy laws
govern—to cede sovereignty when another state has been chosen to
control an international bankruptcy dispute, even though such a
concession may produce a different substantive outcome to the
bankruptcy for the deferring state’s participants. These are the two
anchors of universalism’s theory that must hold for the model to work.

E.

Modifications

Because the universalists recognize the quixotism of their model and
the territorialists the grottiness of theirs, each camp proposes a
“modified” version to bolster appeal.74 Mindful of the substantial
concession that the acceptance of outcome differences requires of the
states on the deferring end of a transnational insolvency, so-called
“modified universalism” replaces the “must” of the application of one
state’s bankruptcy law with a “may.”75 It gives a deferring court a
choice, saying that the court may—perhaps should—capitulate to the
controlling jurisdiction’s bankruptcy proceeding, but the decision is
subject to the discretion of the deferring court. If, for example, it would
be contrary to Country B’s policies to implement Country A’s
bankruptcy laws, the Country B court may refuse to defer to Country A
as the controlling jurisdiction and thus block Country A’s bankruptcy
laws from governing the Country B assets.76
72. LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2237.
73. Westbrook, supra note 1, at 458.
74. For simplicity, I have characterized Professors Westbrook and LoPucki as exemplars of
universalism and territorialism respectively. In fact, each supports the modified analogues of
those respective theories. See Colloquy, supra note 2.
75. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 11.
76. Professor Westbrook uses the examples of the United States’ likely consternation at a
country that distributed bankruptcy assets on a first-come, first-served basis, Westbrook, supra
note 1, at 475, and a country that distributed according to birth, id. at 485. Note that this
“modification” of universalism to accommodate such concerns is actually nothing more than the
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Although some nations accept this compromise and try to be
“modified universalists” (either because they settle for this as a second
best to universalism or because they retain residual risk aversion over
the potentially unforeseen consequences of a fully universalist regime),
their implementing laws and judicial interpretations contain great
slippage. Moreover, the subset of these states that have statutorily dealt
with how and when to defer to foreign proceedings have usually
considered the dissimilarity between the foreign and domestic
bankruptcy laws as a proxy for violations of public policy.77 An
example of such a statute is 11 U.S.C. § 304, which creates a
mechanism for American courts to defer to a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding and which provides a list of statutory factors to guide a court
in deciding when it may defer.78 This list includes a provision permitting
standard so-called “escape clause” found in most choice of law regimes. See, e.g., Symeon C.
Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (and a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75
IND. L.J. 437, 452 (2000) (“Indeed the need for an escape is too obvious to need any defense
here.”) (citing Symeon C. Symeonides, Exception Clauses in American Conflicts Law, 42 AM. J.
COMP. L. 813, 815–18, 864–65 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter Symeonides, Exception Clauses]); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90.
77. Even this may be a charitable characterization, by assuming the laws are at least trying to
balance policy explicitly. See Buxbaum, supra note 37 (criticizing 11 U.S.C. § 304 as allowing
for unprincipled, or at best unsystematic, applications).
78. Section 304 of the U.S. Code permits an ancillary case to be brought in the United States
to assist a foreign proceeding, and § 304(b)(2) permits the turnover of American assets to the
foreign proceeding (for distribution under foreign substantive bankruptcy laws), but only if the
factors of § 304(c) militate in favor of deference. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000). Section 304(c)
provides:
In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall
be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of
such estate, consistent with—
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual
that such foreign proceeding concerns.
Id. at § 304(c). For a helpful discussion of § 304(c), including its legislative history, see Stuart A.
Krause, Peter Janovsky & Marc A. Lebowitz, Relief Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code:
Clarifying the Principal Role of Comity in Transnational Insolvencies, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2591 (1996). For caselaw, see, for example, In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982) (noting that consideration of the § 304(c) factors constitutes a comity inquiry, and
interpreting comity to require deference to the foreign proceeding absent evidence that the
application of foreign law “would be wicked, immoral, or violate public policy”), and
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assessment of whether the other country’s bankruptcy laws are similar
to U.S. law. Taken to its extreme, then, the discretionary safety valve of
modified universalism has the potential simply to “modify”
universalism back into territorialism, because a state may refuse to defer
to the controlling state when its laws are different, i.e., when there is a
true conflict of laws.79
Accordingly, at least as currently implemented, modified
universalism inescapably confronts the issue of substantive
harmonization. This sits in tension with universalism’s theoretical
premise of pluralism.80 But such tension is nevertheless inherent when
universalism is instrumentally “modified” to rely upon discretionary
compliance and when that discretion in turn varies as a function of the
substantive similarity of bankruptcy laws.
Territorialists also refine their theory to a modified form. First, they
espouse departure from the strict baseline of territorial sovereignty by
encouraging “cooperation” by nations on an ad hoc basis if and when a
cross-border dispute arises.81 Thus, rather than requiring ex ante
commitment to universalism, which is likely to scare off sovereigntysensitive states, this “cooperative” territorialist approach accords caseby-case consideration of the cession of jurisdictional control ex post. If
a state determines that its best interests are enhanced by allowing the
foreign state’s laws to control a domestic bankruptcy proceeding, it may
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“Comity should be withheld [in transnational bankruptcies] only when its acceptance would be
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect.”). An excellent discussion of
cases struggling with § 304(c) is presented in Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 42–43, an article
advocating the explicit adoption of conflicts doctrine and theory in American bankruptcy
jurisprudence under § 304(c). The new bankruptcy law has technically repealed § 304 and
adopted the Model Law’s framework, but the old § 304(c) factors have survived in new § 1507,
which provides bankruptcy courts with the factors to consider in determining whether to offer
“additional assistance” (i.e., discretionary relief) to international proceedings under the Model
Law. As part of the revision, former § 304(c) was also amended to elevate comity to the preamble
(from its former position as subsection (c)(5)). It is likely commentators will continue for some
time to refer to new § 1507 as embodying the § 304(c) factors.
79. See LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2221.
80. What little comparative work has been done suggests that different doctrinal constructs
perhaps mask overarching similarities of function. See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A
Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed
Companies, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267 (1994) (conducting comprehensive “systems” comparison
of American and Canadian bankruptcy laws and practices); see also ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 17–
21 (discussing commonalities of three NAFTA members’ bankruptcy laws). But cf. LoPucki,
supra note 48, at 2251 (discussing “sharp differences that exist among the bankruptcy systems of
the various countries”).
81. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 750; LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2219–20.
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elect to defer and let those laws apply. The second modification
territorialists offer intends to combat the potential for mischief inherent
in the bright-line situs rule (eve-of-bankruptcy manipulation through
relocation of assets to havens).82 To combat this weakness, “cooperative
territorialists” recommend international conventions to govern the
return of assets to their proper jurisdictions in the event of improper last
minute relocations.83
In summary, both universalists and territorialists propose
modifications to their theories to tone down their potentially unpalatable
elements. But the modifications reveal important concessions of theory.
First, cooperative territorialists agree that universalism is an
economically superior way to regulate cross-border insolvencies; they
quarrel about whether modified universalism or modified territorialism
represents a more practical, pragmatic model for the interim.84 Thus the
theoretical debate now involves an element of pragmatics as well as
principles. Second, it appears that more discussion is taking place at the
academic level than treaty negotiation or other forms of more official
international dialogue. Accordingly, “modified” versions appear to be
more creations of academic theory than positive descriptions of extant
law. To be sure, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code endorses modified
universalism (the deference is discretionary rather than mandatory), but
there do not yet seem to be corresponding “cooperative territorialist”
countries.85 By contrast, “territorialism” remains vibrant as a matter of
82. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 123. “Havenism” is of course also a risk under universalism
if the choice of law rule is sufficiently bright. See Bob Wessels, International Jurisdiction to Open
Insolvency Proceedings in Europe, in Particular Against (Groups of) Companies 11–12 (Inst. for
Law and Finance, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Working Paper No. 17, 2003), at
http://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/publications/ILF_WP_017.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) (supporting
EU Insolvency Regulation’s rejection of place of incorporation as overly strict jurisdictionselecting rule).
83. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 749 (“Implementing this rule would necessitate treaties that
require the return of fleeing assets, but negotiating these treaties should not be difficult.”).
Professor LoPucki also adds that large (presumably “adjusting”) creditors can protect themselves
with loan covenants even in the absence of such cooperative territorialism treaties, id. at 758, but
Professor Guzman cautions that such restrictions on capital mobility would come at great social
and private cost. Guzman, supra note 25, at 2209. I have my doubts whether such conventions
will be forthcoming, let alone adhered to, by countries otherwise likely to style themselves as
asset havens. For an excellent debate to be published contemporaneously with this Article (that I
have only seen preliminary drafts of), see Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are
Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM. BANK. L.J 105.
84. See LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2217 (“The issue is what to do while we are waiting for
the ‘new world’ society—essentially, a world government—to arrive.”).
85. That is, states that start from a territorialist base but nevertheless subscribe to international
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domestic policy in many countries.86 Thus, whatever convergence may
be emerging in the academic community, no sort of international
consensus has been reached at the legal policymaking level.
In order to analyze the influence of either paradigm on legal reforms,
both of their two fundamental theoretical differences must be
considered. First, because it is a pluralist rather than a fully harmonized
system, universalism requires a content-neutral choice-of-law rule to
designate which country’s substantive bankruptcy law will (or should,
under modified universalism) govern a cross-border financial default.
Territorialism already has such a content-neutral rule, the situs rule,
which is well ingrained in the conflicts of law. Second, because the
purported efficiency (and plausibly fairness) gains from universalism
flow from one law applying to an entire global dispute, the enforcing
courts of ancillary jurisdictions must accept outcome differences in the
distribution of bankruptcy assets brought about by the application of
foreign (norm-laden) law. This is so even if vivid local claimants might
be treated better under the application of domestic law. Territorialists
contend this “acceptance of outcome differences” is also unattainable,
absent a radical harmonization of substantive bankruptcy laws.87
Yet these two conceptual foundations of universalism theory rebuffed
by the territorialists—a viable choice-of-law rule and the acceptance of
outcome differences—are the very elements that are advanced by the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies, which is the
focus of Section III of this Article. Given the ongoing lack of consensus
between countries, with some favoring universalism and others
territorialism, the fact that the Model Law was able to secure
advancements on both of these elements of universalism, and yet still

conventions of asset return. Although the EU Regulation’s secondary proceeding approach might
seem quasi-territorialist, European scholars resist the territorialist label. See Wessels, supra note
6, at 494 (preferring “coordinated universalism”).
86. See, e.g., Antwerp Bulkcarriers, N.V. v. Holt Cargo Systems Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 951
(purporting to eschew strict territorialism but in fact insisting upon the application of Canadian
law due to outcome differences); see also Batra, supra note 43 (India).
87. Professor Westbrook’s third, pragmatic point of “rough similarity” is subordinated to
these two primary theoretical matters because it is a tactical advantage, not a structural necessity,
to the adoption of modified universalism. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 468–69 (arguing that
such similarity is not necessary in principle but “in practice…very important” to establishing an
international regime of modified universalism). Moreover, harmonization (or unification) of
discrete areas of commercial laws occur within a broader framework of legal unification, as Mr.
Eric Bergsten, retired Secretary of UNCITRAL, reminded me by email in response to a draft of
this Article. See E-mail from Eric Bergsten to author (April 6, 2005) (on file with author).
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receives widespread acceptance by universalist and territorialist states
alike, is both remarkable and puzzling.

III. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW: WHAT IT PURPORTS TO DO
A.

Previous International Attempts at Reform

It is commonly noted that it took the United States a century to
formulate its first permanent federal bankruptcy legislation, so it
perhaps should not be surprising that there have been some false starts
in the international realm.88 Indeed, even Canada and the United States
were unable to agree upon a bilateral treaty for cross-border
insolvency.89 The Europeans likewise were unable to harmonize their
myriad disparate laws. The Brussels Convention of September 27, 1968,
on enforcement and recognition of judgments specifically excluded
insolvency proceedings from its scope.90 Follow-up attempts to propose
a draft convention on insolvency in 1982 collapsed because the draft’s
adoption of universalism could not garner support from territorialist
states.91 The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention of June 5, 1990,
also failed, ratified only by Cyprus.92 Even the European Union
Convention of Insolvency Proceedings was unable to be fully ratified by
its 1996 expiration date (although it has now found an outlet as a
Regulation).93
88. See, e.g., Colloquy, supra note 2.
89. This failure is discussed in Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy
Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2556 (1996). The only meaningful
multistate treaty of even moderate success appears to be the Convention Regarding Bankruptcy,
Nov. 7, 1933, Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-Swed., 155 L.N.T.S. 115 (revised 1977 and 1982), and even
that is riddled with exceptions. See Tung, supra note 15, at 565 n.42; see also Michael Bogdan,
International Bankruptcy Law in Scandinavia, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49 (1985). An excellent
survey, which covers recent African and Asian efforts, is in Bob Wessels, Comparative and
International Insolvency Law: Current Positions and Future Trends from a Continental European
Perspective, at 5–8 (INSOL Conference Paper, Sydney 2005) (on file with author).
90. See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, done Sep. 27, 1968, art. 1(2), 29 I.L.M. 1417–18.
91. See Berends, supra note 12, at 316–17.
92. See European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Insolvency, opened for
signature May 6, 1990, art. 14, Europ. T.S. No. 136, 30 I.L.M. 165 [hereinafter Istanbul
Convention].
93. See European Union: Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M.
1223, adopted in relevant part by Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency
Proceedings, O.J. (L 160), available at http://Europa.eu.int/eur-lex/. This Regulation became
effective in May 2002 for all members except Denmark. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2280.
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Moreover, the failures at international reform were not limited to
conventions. The International Bar Association promulgated the Model
International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) in 1989, an
ambitious attempt to establish a universalist regime by enacting states.94
Its staunch universalism likely alienated territorialists, and it never
received widespread acceptance.95 On the other hand, the less
threatening Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, formally adopted by
the International Bar Association on June 1, 1996, offers only “general
principles” to assist participants of transnational insolvencies,96 and
appears to have been embraced somewhat more favorably.97
Analyzing the Model Law’s less successful predecessors, it becomes
apparent that the universalism-territorialism debate of how to design an
international bankruptcy regime remained too volatile to permit
meaningful convergence on one approach. The more affiliated a
proposal was with one extreme, such as the European attempt and the
MIICA model law of the 1980s—both of which pushed universalism
aggressively—the more likely it was doomed to failure.98 By contrast,
the ten non-binding principles of general applicability from the

The implementation of this agreement as a regulation instead of a convention has to do with the
United Kingdom’s touchiness over mad cow disease, a matter well beyond the scope of this
Article. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Scene, The International Year in Review, 2001
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2001).
94. MIICA’s text can be found in 12 CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE
DIMENSIONS (THE ABERYSTWYTH INSOLVENCY PAPERS) 287–96 (Ian Fletcher ed., United
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 1990) [hereinafter MIICA].
95. MIICA’s future is discussed in IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 325–26 (1999). Although
MIICA was strongly universalist in its deference to a primary jurisdiction’s substantive
bankruptcy laws, it curiously provided no choice of law rule for determining the primary
jurisdiction. It did, however, confront the issue of deference to non-enacting jurisdictions by
mandating “unilateral” deference to non-enacting states if to do so would be to the general benefit
of all creditors. See MIICA, supra note 94, § 1(a).
96. The Concordat does, however, make clear its universalist proclivity. See International Bar
Association Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, Principle 1 (1995), at http://www.ibanet.org/
images/downloads/Cross-Border%20Insolvency%20Concordat%201995.pdf (last visited Nov. 6,
2005).
97. In re Everfresh, 238 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995), involved a Canadian-U.S. crossborder insolvency. The Concordat was relied upon heavily by both courts and found its way into
the joint protocol. See Anne Nielsen et al., The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to
Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 557–61 (1996).
98. The comparison of the European proposal and MIICA is noteworthy, because there is a
natural experiment of “public” vs. “private” legislatures trying to reform international bankruptcy
law. Both failed. No state has tried to codify the status quo of territorialism into a treaty, which is
indirect evidence that the unresolved nature of the debate would preclude such a codification;
universalists would balk.
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Concordat achieved at least marginal success, doubtless due to their
vagueness. Therefore the explicit decision of the Model Law’s drafters
to avoid taking a firm stance on the unsettled universalism-territorialism
debate is one of the Law’s central and distinguishing characteristics.

B.

UNCITRAL Model Law

1.

Introduction

The Model Law is a suggested template for domestic legislative
reform, for states to adopt either wholesale or with minor
modifications.99 It was completed with the input of thirty-six member
and forty observer states of UNCITRAL, as well as thirteen
international organizations.100 Most participants were esteemed
bankruptcy practitioners, judges, and academics.101 A final version was
adopted in 1997, and a Guide to Enactment (Enactment Guide) was
published in 1998.102 The Model Law has been proposed for adoption in
numerous jurisdictions, including the United States, where it has just
become (in April 2005) Title 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The national
delegations have roundly advocated the law’s adoption in their
99. Cf. Matthew T. Cronin, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Procedural
Approach to a Substantive Problem, 24 J. CORP. L. 709, 711 (1999) (noting that an amendment to
Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is “comparable” to the Model Law “in many important
respects” but that its difference still creates “quite dissimilar ‘uniform’ law” from the Model
Law).
100. See Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, ¶ 8,
reprinted in 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1998) [hereinafter Enactment Guide].
101. Id. ¶ 5. Professor Stephan worries that “the use of [these] technical experts at the center
of an international process result[s] in [the] kind of legislation that we might expect from the most
venal of domestic political bodies.” Stephan, supra note 11, at 768. Stephan’s concern employs
Bob Scott and Alan Schwartz’s political economy analysis of private legislative bodies (such as
NCCUSL and the ALI) to predict that such technocratic, private lawmaking efforts either produce
vague, standard-like provisions offensive to no constituency of meaningful lobbying power or
bright, specific rules that inure to the benefit of such meaningfully powerful constituencies. See
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 595, 630–37 (1995). Professor Stephan and Professors Schwartz and Scott seem to disagree
mildly over the comparative expertise of these technocratic institutions, with Stephan
acknowledging their faculties and Schwartz questioning their ability to engage in better factfinding than a public legislature. Compare Stephan, supra note 11, at 755–56, with Schwartz &
Scott, supra, at 651. Although Stephan worries that countries “rarely…impose…political
constraints” on their international delegates, supra note 11, at 756, at least one national delegate
was conscious of his status as a mere agent representing the views of his country. See Berends,
supra note 12, at 321 (noting that he “d[id] not agree with everything that is in the Model Law”).
102. See generally Enactment Guide, supra note 100 (providing a description of the process
of adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law).
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respective jurisdictions.103 Thus the Model Law’s reception can be
characterized as a success in several ways. First, the Model Law
succeeded at garnering the approval of an important international quasilegislative body, UNCITRAL, where its adoption was strongly
supported by delegates from territorialist and universalist states alike.
Promulgation of anything, even if only a “model” rather than binding
law, is a tremendous advancement in its own right given international
bankruptcy’s disappointing track record.
Second, the Model Law is not just a model but is actually becoming
adopted as real, domestic “hard” law in countries around the world as
they engage in piecemeal reform efforts of their own bankruptcy
legislations: Japan, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and New Zealand, among others, have led the way.104
While the Model Law has not been enacted verbatim in these countries,
and while there has been some foot-dragging, the trajectory appears
positive. This promising trend of domestic enactment is another way of
characterizing the Model Law as a success.
We might still further call the Model Law a success on a normative
level because it appears to promote universalism as the prescriptive
model for resolving international bankruptcy disputes (and
universalism, for the reasons a majority of scholars acknowledge, is the
better road). My focus on the Model Law moves beyond the normative
discussion, however, which I take as a given, into an analysis of what
about the Model Law led to its success after so many false starts. It is
this final level of success—unexpected success in the face of repeated
failure—that is most worthy of exploration.
The Model Law’s most important feature is that its scope is selfconsciously constrained.105 It does not settle the universalismterritorialism question. On the contrary, the drafters seemed to sidestep
this core issue altogether. They did this in two ways: by cutting a
“middle ground” between universalism and territorialism on those

103. See Westbrook, supra note 13; see also, Cronin, supra note 99, at 712 (discussing
National Bankruptcy Review Commission). For a comprehensive summary of the enactment
process in the first countries to consider the Model Law, see Westbrook, supra note 8, at 24–30.
104. See generally Westbrook, supra note 8 (describing domestic reform efforts in various
nations).
105. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 3 (describing the Model Law as “modest”); Jay
L. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 571 (1996)
(“Given the difficulty of the subject and the primitive state of international bankruptcy law as it
is, the aim of the UNCITRAL initiative is to establish just a small number of key improvements,
with the hope of building further on that achievement in the future.”).
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matters where it had to engage the debate,106 and by focusing the bulk of
the provisions on matters of procedure where the debate could be
seemingly avoided altogether.107 In the words of its Enactment Guide,
the Model Law’s “scope [is] limited to some procedural aspects of
cross-border insolvency cases.”108 The Model Law “does not…set forth
a complete framework for the resolution of cross-border bankruptcies;
instead, it creates [merely] a set of procedural rules to be integrated into
the substantive bankruptcy law of each state that adopts the Model
Law.”109
The Model Law’s limited provisions can be clustered into two broad
areas, “administrative” and “substantial.” The first cluster,
administrative provisions, might be divided further into two subsidiary
categories: first, provisions related to international cooperation and
communication, and second, antidiscrimination rules. The first category
includes, for example, Articles 25 through 27 and Article 30, in which
the Model Law codifies a series of rules built from the fledgling
precedents of ad hoc sovereign cooperation and international
protocols.110 Article 25 (“Cooperation and direct communication
106. The Enactment Guide and Model Law do not even use the words “territorialism” or
“universalism,” although traditional commentators recognize the compromise. See, e.g., Claudia
Tobler, Note, Managing Failure in the New Global Economy: The UNCITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 383, 410 (1999) (“The Model Law
balances universality goals against the needs of territoriality based regimes.”).
107. See Cronin, supra note 99, at 709–10. These two elements of the Model Law—neutrality
and procedural focus—are conceptually related if one characterizes the theoretical debate
between territorialism and universalism as “substantive.” See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 33
n.66 (characterizing a move from territorialism to universalism as “substantive”). Accordingly,
the Model Law’s neutrality (its attempt to avoid picking sides in the universalism-territorialism
debate) is seemingly complemented by its focus on procedural matters (avoiding the subject
matter of topics likely to implicate the debate altogether).
108. Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 20. The Model Law might fit within the
philosophical paradigm of functionalism, which advocates technocratic minimalism as the path
toward substantive unification. See ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1958), discussed
in Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2288 n.58.
109. Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 34. Indeed, the very title of one commentator’s piece, “A
Procedural Approach to a Substantive Problem,” underscores the entrenched premise of the
Model Law’s modest, procedural focus in the literature. See Cronin, supra note 99, at 711 (“The
Model Law does not seek to unify or change the substantive insolvency laws of the enacting
State. Rather, the Model Law seeks to change only the procedural law of the enacting State by
encouraging and facilitating cooperation between States.”); see also Tobler, supra note 106, at
408, 410 (noting law’s focus on “procedural means” and judging it to “balance” between
universalism and territorialism as a “political necessity”).
110. The use of ad hoc protocols, which are addressed in the Model Law, is prevalent in
international bankruptcies. See, e.g., In re Maruko, 200 B.R. 876 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (Japan);
In re Nakash, 190 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Israel); In re Everfresh 238 B.R. 558
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between a court of this State and foreign courts or foreign
representatives”) is illustrative. It mandates court cooperation “to the
maximum extent possible,”111 and makes explicit a domestic court’s
entitlement to “communicate directly with, or to request information or
assistance directly from, foreign courts.”112 These changes are especially
important in civil law jurisdictions where such power may not be
inferred as easily from inherent judicial authority as at common law,113
but unremarkable beyond their confirmation of the general aspiration
for international cooperation. They do not speak to the ongoing issues of
contention in the universalist-territorialist debate. If anything, they
simply reinforce the characterization of the Model Law as a “feel good”
document concerned mostly with procedural matters.
Similarly, the second category of administrative changes also pertains
to issues regarding which there is developing universal consensus.
Provisions under this category would include Article 9 (“Right of direct
access”); Article 12 (“Participation of a foreign representative in a
[domestic insolvency]”); Article 13 (“Access of foreign creditors to a
[domestic insolvency proceeding]”); and Article 24 (“Intervention by a
foreign representative in proceedings in this State”). These provisions
may be seen as antidiscrimination rules that generally require a state to
accord full access and treatment to foreign bankruptcy representatives
and creditors.114 Again, these provisions, while important, likely
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Canada). See generally Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman,
Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 587 (1998) (discussing and
reproducing protocols). Economically inclined scholars delight in the efficiency gains of private
ordering from these protocols. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 31 (“In effect, the two
parties [in Maxwell Communication] negotiated a treaty for this case.”). Others note that it is
more precisely the courts that are negotiating their jurisdiction “through the medium of the
parties.” Jay L. Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 567, 573
(2003). For historical treatment, see Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy
Law and Practice: Is it Necessary? Is it Possible?, 27 INT’L LAW. 881, 899–900 (1993) (noting
that ad hoc cooperation in financial default could be traced back to Pope Boniface VIII in 1302).
111. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 25(1).
112. Id. art. 25(2).
113. See, e.g., ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 5 n.6 (noting that Mexico’s civil law tradition
requires greater reliance on statutory enactments).
114. Article 13(2), while addressed to antidiscrimination, does not require full “national
treatment” of foreign creditors. See Jay L. Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J.
27, 29 (1998). Instead, it ensures only the (arguably dubious) protection that foreign creditors
may not be relegated below domestic general unsecured creditors. See MODEL LAW, supra note
5, art. 13(2) (permitting substantive bankruptcy laws of priority to discriminate against foreign
creditors “except that the claims of foreign creditors shall not be ranked lower than [general nonpreference creditors]”). This preserves protectionist quirks such as 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5)(B)
(giving priority preference to claims of “United States fisherm[e]n”). Note that even the Model
Law, however, countenances the intractability of discrimination against certain mainstays, such as
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memorialize emerging practice.115 They only tangentially involve the
deep, broad, and prickly elements that constitute domestic bankruptcy
laws.
Having thus flagged the administrative cluster of provisions that
codify current trends of ad hoc cooperation and antidiscrimination, I
wish to focus on the second, more “substantial” cluster. These are the
parts that engage (but then seek neutrality on) the ongoing theoretical
debate about universalism. These are found principally in Chapter III of
the Model Law, which is entitled “Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding
and Relief.” This focus of inquiry is supported by the conclusion of one
drafter that “Chapter III contains the most important provisions of the
Model Law.”116

2.

Core Provisions of the Model Law

a.

One Part Universalism

The core provisions of the Model Law address a request made to a
domestic court by a foreign representative (such as a bankruptcy trustee)
to “recognize” domestically a bankruptcy proceeding already afoot in a
foreign state. For example, the representative may seek an enforcement
order by the recognizing court to carry out the effects of an order
entered by the foreign court that regards assets or parties within the
recognizing jurisdiction. Most significantly, from the universalist
perspective, the foreign representative—if coming from the jurisdiction
that a neutral choice-of-law rule would determine to be the controlling
jurisdiction—would likely request the domestic court to “turn over”
local assets to the representative’s control for administration in the
foreign proceeding according to the priority and distribution rules of the
foreign bankruptcy laws. Before even getting to a request for turnover,
however, the foreign representative will first and foremost seek a stay of
foreign tax claims, although it disfavors such discrimination. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art.
9 & cmt. 105 (alternative version of art. 9 allowing for discrimination against foreign tax claims).
In terms of the substance-procedure distinction discussed later in this paper, see infra Section
V.C, it is unsurprising that the Model Law stops short of a full antidiscrimination injunction on
priority rules (the substantive heart of a domestic insolvency law) and instead reserves its clearest
antidiscrimination mandate for more traditionally procedural matters, such as access to courts
(art. 12) and standing to intervene (art. 24).
115. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 34 n.46 (“[F]ew countries practice active discrimination on
the basis of citizenship or residence….”).
116. Berends, supra note 12, at 349.
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all activities in the domestic country or, if a worldwide stay has been
ordered in the foreign proceeding already, a domestic order enforcing
the foreign-issued stay.117
Anticipating this prototypical international scenario of stay and
turnover, the Model Law prescribes a set of rules for domestic courts
when they are presented with a request to “recognize” a foreign
bankruptcy. The Model Law—in probably its most legally significant
provision—directs a domestic court to determine first whether the
request emanates from a “main” or “non-main” foreign bankruptcy
proceeding.118 The foreign representative’s request emanates from a
“foreign main proceeding” if the foreign bankruptcy is in the country
where “the debtor has the centre of its main interests.”119 If it does not
come from such a focal point, the request is categorized as coming from
a “foreign non-main proceeding.”120 The distinction, based on where the
debtor has the center of its main interests, is fundamental to the
structure of the Model Law.
From the foreign representative’s perspective, the most crucial
distinction is the imposition of a stay. If the bankruptcy is recognized as
a “foreign main proceeding,” a domestic stay enters (in accordance with
domestic bankruptcy law) automatically under Article 20 of the Model
Law, as if the debtor had filed for bankruptcy domestically.121 (While a
foreign non-main proceeding may also earn a stay under Article 21,

117. The protective force of the stay is recognized as central to most insolvency proceedings.
See ALI TIP, supra note 8, General Principle III & Cmt. (recognizing that a moratorium helps
prevent fraud, achieve court control, enhance the value of the debtor’s assets, and even promote
“social order”).
118. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 2 (defining “foreign main proceeding” and “foreign
non-main proceeding”).
119. Id. art. 2(b). This test is used in other international documents, such as the EU
Regulation.
120. Id. art. 2(c). Indeed, to be more precise, the request may come from neither a foreign
main proceeding nor a foreign non-main proceeding, because even a “foreign non-main
proceeding” has requirements. To be a foreign non-main proceeding, the proceeding must be in a
country where the debtor has an “establishment” (i.e., “any place of operations where the debtor
carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services,” Id. art.
2(f)). See id. art. 2(c). For analysis of “establishment,” see Wessels, supra note 82, at 11–12.
121. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 20(1) (“Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding
that is a foreign main proceeding, (a) Commencement or continuation of individual actions or
individual proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities is stayed;
(b) Execution against the debtor’s assets is stayed; and (c) The right to transfer, encumber or
otherwise dispose of any assets of the debtor is suspended.”). Section 20(2) clarifies that the
scope of such stay is congruent with the bankruptcy stay under the domestic law of the
recognizing state. Id. art. 20(2).
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such a stay is purely discretionary.)122 The automatic stay enjoyed by a
foreign main bankruptcy is then followed by a request for more
permanent relief, under Article 21.123 Assuming the prototypical request
in a liquidation is for turnover, Article 21(1)(e) permits turnover of
domestic assets to the foreign proceeding for distribution, subject to
certain constraints to be discussed below.124 But, again, the distinction
between the foreign proceeding as “main” or “non-main” affects the
result. While assets may presumptively be turned over to a foreign main
proceeding (provided certain statutory safeguards are met), only limited
assets may be sent to a foreign non-main proceeding: those assets that
the domestic court’s choice-of-law rules determine should be
administered in the foreign proceeding under foreign law.125 Thus, even
if uncontested by any opposing creditors, a request for turnover to a
non-main proceeding is statutorily prohibited if the non-main
proceeding should not be governing the assets under domestic choiceof-law rules. Therefore, the Model Law can be said to discriminate,
overtly, in favor of foreign main proceedings over foreign non-main
proceedings.
Taking these two key provisions—automatic stay and turnover—
together, the designation of a foreign proceeding as a “main
proceeding” captures the first theoretical pillar of universalism. It is a
content-neutral rule (the “centre of the debtor’s main interests”) that
chooses the jurisdiction (the state of a “foreign main proceeding”) of
presumptive entitlement to control the distribution of a debtor’s
assets.126 This presumptive entitlement is demonstrated by the
122. See id. art. 21(1)(a), (b), and (c).
123. See id. art. 21 (“Relief that may be granted upon recognition of a foreign proceeding.”).
124. Id. art. 21(1)(e) provides that a domestic court, upon recognizing a foreign proceeding,
may order any appropriate relief, including “[e]ntrusting the administration or realization of all or
part of the debtor’s assets located in this State to the foreign representative or another person
designated by the court.”
125. See id. art. 21(3) (“In granting relief under this article to a representative of a foreign
non-main proceeding, the court must be satisfied that the relief relates to assets that, under the law
of this State, should be administered in the foreign non-main proceeding or concerns information
required in that proceeding.”).
126. “Centre of main interests” is a rule. Whether it is a good rule depends upon its
comparison to the status quo situs rule that anchors territorialism. Whether either such rule affects
forum shopping depends upon, among other factors, the remoteness of the bankruptcy payoff on
ex ante credit pricing, a topic upon which there are volumes of academic literature already. For a
recent offering, see Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV.
1199 (2005). Bankruptcy’s compulsory jurisdiction over multiple stakeholders makes “racing”
analysis more complicated than the general corporate law context because there is greater
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imposition of the automatic stay under Article 20 against all domestic
actions, coupled with the turnover relief a domestic court may—and
presumably should—order under Article 21(1)(e).127 Without more, the
Model Law would clearly be a pluralist universalist vehicle: a regime
for promoting the worldwide distribution of international assets under
one state’s substantive bankruptcy law pursuant to a jurisdictionselecting choice-of-law rule.

b.

One Part Territorialism

It is of course not that simple. Were it so, the Model Law would have
been denounced by territorialists and declared a victory by universalists.
Therefore, the Model Law offsets this potential adoption of
universalism with three powerfully territorialist caveats. First, the
Model Law contains an escape clause in Article 6 permitting general
non-compliance;128 second, it contains a safeguard clause constraining
Article 21(1)(e)’s universalist turnover power;129 and third, it contains a
mechanism to preserve the “pre-eminence” of local proceedings over
any foreign proceeding (including a foreign main proceeding) under
Articles 28 and 29.130
Article 6 of the Model Law is a general escape clause that permits
refusal of cooperation when to do so would be “manifestly contrary” to
the domestic state’s “public policy.”131 This on its own is unexceptional.
mischief, at least theoretically, for third-party rent extraction from non-adjusting creditors if
debtors and their lenders can shop for bankruptcy forums.
127. The text of Article 21 simply says “may,” which is neutral. MODEL LAW, supra note 5,
art. 21(1). The “should” is implied by the Model Law’s overall structure and purpose.
128. See id. art. 6 (“Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to take an action
governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of this
State.”).
129. See id. art. 21(2) (restricting the domestic court’s power to order turnover of domestic
assets to administration in a foreign proceeding to situations when “the court is satisfied that the
interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected”).
130. See id. art. 28 (“After recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a proceeding under
[domestic insolvency laws] may be commenced….”); id. art. 29 (“Where a foreign proceeding
and a [domestic proceeding] are taking place concurrently regarding the same debtor…(a)(i) Any
relief granted under article 19 or 21 [to the foreign representative] must be consistent with the
[domestic proceeding]; and (ii) If the foreign proceeding is recognized in this State as a foreign
main proceeding, [the automatic stay of] article 20 does not apply….”); see also id. art. 20(4)
(“[The automatic stay of] Paragraph 1 of this article does not affect the right to request the
commencement of a proceeding under [domestic insolvency law]….”). The Enactment Guide
accordingly concludes that Article 29 “maintains a pre-eminence of the local proceeding over the
foreign proceeding” in numerous ways. Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 190.
131. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 6. The Enactment Guide makes clear that Article 6 is
intended to be used sparingly. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶¶ 88–89 (emphasizing that
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In fact, it simply codifies pre-existing conflicts law.132 Seen another
way, Article 6 does no more than embrace modified universalism.
The greater problem with calling the Model Law universalist comes
from the safeguard clause of Article 21(2). While turnover of all
domestic property is in theory permitted to a foreign main proceeding
under Article 21(1)(e), Article 21(2) explicitly incorporates a
retrenchment. Specifically, Article 21(2) provides:
[T]he court may, at the request of the foreign representative,
entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor’s assets located
in this State to the foreign representative or another person
designated by the court, provided that the court is satisfied that
the interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected.133
By expressly constraining the turnover power to instances where “the
interests” of domestic creditors are “adequately protected,” Article
21(2) invites, at least on one plausible reading, the domestic court to
conduct a substantive review of the foreign bankruptcy law, just as
some courts did under Section 304(c) of the U.S. Code.134 A domestic
creditor can always argue its “interests” are not “adequately protected”
if its priority status is lowered by being subjected to less-favorable
foreign substantive bankruptcy law.135 Thus far from fostering the
clause should be “interpreted restrictively” and used only in “exceptional circumstances” of
“fundamental importance”).
132. See generally Symeonides, Exception Clauses, supra note 76. Berends, supra note 12, at
336, explains that Dutch law distinguishes between garden-variety “domestic” public policy, and
less restrictive “international” public policy. Thus Dutch courts will not demand the same level of
public policy comportment of a foreign proceeding as they would with a domestic proceeding.
This suggests, for example, that a foreign contract that would be void under Dutch law might well
be enforced in a Dutch court out of international comity; see also Enactment Guide, supra note
100, ¶ 88 (recognizing this trend of distinguishing “domestic” and “international” standards of
public policy in a “growing number of jurisdictions”).
133. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 21(2) (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 BR 165, 167–69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
135. A strain of this argument was tried in In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 2001),
where the court reversed the lower court’s deference to a Bahamian main proceeding under §
304(c)(4), on the appeal of a secured creditor who, under American law, would receive full
recovery, but under Bahamian law, would recover only after the administrative expenses were
paid. In holding that the secured creditor’s complaint was well grounded, the court seemed to be
guided not so much by the dissimilarity of payout per se (secured creditors coming after
administrative expenses under Bahamian law) but by the startling fact that the Bahamian
administrators had devoured $8 million (USD) in fees on an estate of $10 million, with more
expenses still to come. See id. at 161. Thus a procedural impropriety argument was likely lurking
within the court’s acceptance of the secured creditor’s protest of differential payout. My
interpretation of Treco appears to be supported by at least subsequent decision. See In re Petition
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acceptance of substantive outcome differences, a first principle of
universalism, Article 21(2) of the Model Law seems at best to
discourage it and at worst to forbid it.
The final nail in the coffin for a universalist interpretation of the
Model Law—and an explicit assertion of the Law’s territorialism—is
found in Articles 28 and 29, which confirm the “pre-eminence” of local
proceedings. According to these provisions, the recognition of a foreign
main proceeding does not impede the filing of a full-blown “plenary”
insolvency action in a domestic bankruptcy tribunal. This is potentially
fatal to universalism. Consider an American-based debtor that holds
minimal assets in a Canadian warehouse and that has filed a liquidation
proceeding in a United States bankruptcy court. The American trustee
would file an application under the Model Law in a Canadian court for
recognition of the American proceeding under Article 15(1)
(“Application for recognition of a foreign proceeding”) as a “foreign
main proceeding” and for consequent invocation of a stay under Article
20(1) in accordance with Canadian law.136 She would then seek turnover
of the Canadian assets under Article 21(1)(e) for distribution in the
American main proceeding under American bankruptcy law.137
Articles 28 and 29, nevertheless, permit a Canadian insolvency
proceeding to be opened in a Canadian court (for example, by a
sophisticated American creditor who realizes it would enjoy higher
priority payout under Canadian bankruptcy law, even if its priority is
applied only to the smaller pool of Canadian assets). The stay accorded
the American proceeding in Canada under Article 20(1) is dissolved
under Article 29(b)(ii), as if the Model Law had never imposed a stay at
all.138 The result reverts the insolvency to the status quo: a territorialist
system where the freshly opened Canadian proceeding has control over
the Canadian assets under Canadian law and the American proceeding
over the American assets under American law, with cooperation and
deference depending on the pre-existing comity practices of each
jurisdiction.139

of Bd. of Directors of Compania General de Combustibles S.A., 269 B.R. 104, 114 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2001).
136. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts. 15(1), 20(1).
137. Id. art. 21(1)(e).
138. Id. art. 29(b)(ii).
139. Full plenary proceedings are available under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. §
304 (2005). This may be subsumed by Model Law Articles 28 and 29 (as enacted at 11 U.S.C. §§
1528–29). The EU Regulation is closer to the Articles 28–29 “local proceeding” approach.
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In sum, it is understandable why the Model Law is characterized as
modest and as not settling the universalist-territorialist debate. True, it
embraces one of the two theoretical cores of universalism: a
jurisdiction-selecting choice-of-law rule (“centre of main interests”). It
even backs up that rule with an automatic stay and potential turnover
power. Despite the universalist features, it makes that rule effectively
voluntary by allowing the adversely affected parties the opportunity to
undermine the stay by filing a domestic (territorialist) proceeding.140
This clashes with the second theoretical foundation of universalism:
forcing unhappy states and creditors to accept the difference of
outcomes inevitably flowing from the application of the selected
jurisdiction’s laws. Therefore the Model Law, on the surface, appears to
be a hybrid of sorts: partially universalist in outreach, but partially
territorialist in retrenchment. It is this compromise approach, which
some might say is anchored more in pragmatics than principle,141 that
should make both territorialists and universalists equally happy (or
sad).142 Likely due to the feel-good administrative provisions about
facilitating international communication and cooperation, the overall
consensus has trended toward happiness.143 The Model Law, like
anything else that tries to compromise and seems to do nothing,144 earns
self-congratulation from drafters and internationally minded
policymakers, but exasperation from scrutinizing commentators.145
140. See, e.g., Tobler, supra note 106, at 409–10.
141. Writing about the EU Convention that ultimately spawned the EU Regulation, Professor
Fletcher observed, with equal applicability to the Model Law,
Although the resulting mix of principles may draw the wrathful ire of purists who
happen to adhere to one or other of the dogmatic theories [of universalism or
territorialism], the Convention represents a triumph of the “art of the possible” in the
delicate field of international treaty negotiation…whereby the best can become the
enemy of the good.
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124.
142. See Berends, supra note 12, at 320–21 (underscoring compromises required to complete
the Model Law and noting that, as a key drafter, he did “not agree with everything that is in the
Model Law”).
143. See generally Westbrook, supra note 13.
144. Perhaps the Model Law could be seen as an illustration of the hypothesized proclivities
of “private legislatures” to prefer in most circumstances vague standards to clear rules in
reformist projects. See Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1042
(2002) (“These [vague] rules will result, not from their intrinsic merits, but from the compromises
that reformer-dominated [bodies] will accept in order to secure enactment.”).
145. See Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 35–36 (“Thus, in explicitly recognizing and deferring to
a court’s ability to implement a territorial approach, the [Model Law] not only falls short of its
promise of universality but also gives new vitality to territoriality.”); Liza Perkins, Note, A
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IV. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW: WHAT IT REALLY DOES
Of the scholarly analyses of the Model Law to date, most have
discussed the Model Law’s modesty and “middle ground” between the
theories of territorialism and universalism.146 These conventional
assessments do not reflect sufficiently the true nature of the Model Law,
which is to advance the agenda of universalism. Universalism is
advanced not by express adoption of a full-fledged universalism regime,
where countries defer to one controlling jurisdiction on all elements of
the bankruptcy pursuant to a choice-of-law rule. Rather, universalism is
advanced incrementally, by building upon its first principles. That is,
the Model Law embraces universalism’s two foundations: it proffers a
viable and neutral jurisdiction-selecting choice-of-law rule, and it
fosters the introduction, albeit on a fledgling scale, of the acceptance of
outcome differences in transnational insolvencies.

A.

Jurisdiction-Selecting Choice-of-Law Rule

The Model Law develops a workable choice-of-law rule, embodied in
Articles 2, 20, and 21. As explained above, Article 2 defines “foreign
main proceeding” as a “proceeding taking place in the State where the
debtor has the centre of its main interests.”147 Article 20(1) puts this into
force by imposing an automatic stay in the recognizing jurisdiction that
operates instantaneously upon determination that the request for
deference emanates from a foreign main proceeding.148 Article 21(1)(e)
builds upon this choice of law by enabling domestic asset turnover to
the main proceeding for distribution under foreign bankruptcy law.149
Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 787, 828 (2000) (“[The Model Law] do[es] not go far enough. In fact, the UNCITRAL
Model Law, even if widely enacted, may do little to change the dreadful state of affairs in
international bankruptcy law.”); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124 (acknowledging
compromise approaches “draw the wrathful ire of purists”).
146. See Section III.B.2, supra. The Model Law’s attempt to cut a neutral path between
universalism and territorialism has unsurprisingly led to some confusion with a few authors.
Compare Cronin, supra note 99, at 711 (“The Model Law adopts what one could call a
cooperative territorial approach.”) with Perkins, supra note 145, at 803 (“[T]he Model
Law…would essentially codify a U.S.-style regime of ‘modified universalism’ for the enacting
nation(s)….”). Most, however, simply recognize the middle-roading for what it is. See Tobler,
supra note 106, at 410 (“The Model Law balances universality goals against the needs of
territoriality based regimes.”).
147. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 2(b); see also id. art. 17(2)(a) (dictating that a foreign
main proceeding is recognized if it takes place in the state where the debtor has its center of main
interests).
148. See id. art. 20(1).
149. See id. art. 21(1)(e).
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The Model Law therefore picks the “centre of main interests” to
decide which foreign bankruptcy proceedings should enjoy greater legal
force (automatic vs. discretionary stays) in the recognizing
jurisdiction.150 This ascribes fundamental significance and superior
regulatory entitlement to one and only one jurisdiction: that of the
center of the debtor’s main interests.151 That the Model Law does so
regarding the imposition of an automatic stay is important, because the
stay of proceedings triggered by the initiation of an insolvency action is
a core element of many insolvency regimes.152 Thus even though Article
21(2) waters down the turnover power of the domestic court and stops
short of complete universalism, Article 20(1) on its own suffices to
implement the theoretical concession of sovereigns that one jurisdiction
is “more important” than others: universalism’s theoretical focus on one
law.153 (Furthermore, as discussed below, it is far from clear that the
exceptions of Article 21(2) are quite so lethal to the Model Law’s
nascent universalism as conventional analysis suggests.)
In conflicts parlance, the Model Law’s adoption of a center of main
interests test is a multilateralist choice-of-law rule, because it recognizes
the possibility of several interested states and attempts to find the nexus
of greatest connection between one jurisdiction and the worldwide
insolvency.154 While the Model Law only implements the choice-of-law
150. The pros and cons of the “centre of main interests” test have been analyzed elsewhere.
For a critical discussion, see LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2226–29. For a legislative history of other
contenders, see Berends, supra note 12, at 330.
151. See Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 45 (noting that the Model Law’s “deference to foreign
main proceedings sketches the outlines of a true jurisdiction-selecting rule based on a notion of
the ‘proper seat’ of the insolvency proceeding”).
152. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 36–37, 56–67. Note that even in jurisdictions that do not
embrace as broad-sweeping an automatic stay as the United States, a moratorium plays an
important role. For example, in Canada, where secured creditors are nominally immune from the
automatic stay, there is at least some interim breathing relief of ten days’ notice before
foreclosure and a routine practice of court-ordered discretionary relief. See LoPucki & Triantis,
supra note 80, at 279 n.32. Countries that do not stay some liquidations automatically will
routinely grant asset-specific or proceeding-specific protection measures. See Anderson, supra
note 31, at 705 (discussing Japanese order of hozen shobun).
153. Professor Buxbaum agrees. See Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 45 n.123 (“While this
arrangement does operate as a concession to territoriality, it does not undermine the impact of the
initial recognition [of the foreign bankruptcy].”).
154. See id. at 38–41, 47–48 (canvassing conflicts literature and contrasting paradigms of
unilateralism and multilateralism). The Model Law’s rule also seems to be an interest-based
analysis, because it tries to apply the substantive law of the state with the greatest interest in
regulating the conduct at issue. See generally Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A
Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). While some modern conflicts
scholars build upon interest analysis, see Kramer, supra note 37, at 279 (suggesting that Currie’s
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rule for individualized, discrete issues (such as the automatic application
of the stay), it lays the groundwork that is conceivably extendable to the
selection of the substantive rules of priority and distribution, i.e., to the
adoption of universalism. The Model Law thus drops the first shoe of
universalism’s theory, by providing the choice-of-law rule. That the
Model Law does not go all the way, by requiring the recognizing court
to let the main jurisdiction’s substantive bankruptcy laws govern,
diminishes neither the conceptual significance of the Law’s
multilateralism, nor the advancement of hammering out a specific
choice-of-law rule. Indeed, as discussed below, that may be its
brilliance.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the purportedly stay-unraveling
provisions of Article 21(2)’s safeguard clause and Articles 28 and 29’s
local proceedings provisions are anywhere near so fatal to the impact of
the choice-of-law rule as initially implied. First, while Article 21(2)’s
insistence on “adequate protection” of domestic creditors as a condition
of turnover appears to import territorialist considerations, it is by no
means a compelled conclusion of statutory interpretation. As discussed
above, certainly one possible way to interpret “adequate protection” is
to require substantive judicial scrutiny of the foreign bankruptcy law
and construe any deviation from domestic priorities to render a domestic
creditor “inadequately protected.” An equally plausible interpretation,
however, would be to construe the phrase procedurally, and permit
turnover as a remedy only if a domestic creditor is accorded sufficient
notice and time to file a claim in the foreign main proceeding.155 Indeed,
substantive comparison of domestic bankruptcy laws seems an unlikely
intent of the drafters, who were clearly familiar with the U.S. Code’s
Section 304(c)(4) and declined that route.156 If anything, the Model
basic insights are still relevant to the choice of law process), others reject it, see O’Hara &
Ribstein, supra note 66 (arguing that interest analysis improperly focuses on state interests rather
than private actor interests).
155. Cf. Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988) (refusing to defer to
an Australian proceeding because of, among other reasons, the entry of an ex parte order
approving a settlement). For a critique of this case, and of this argument in particular as a
makeweight, see Westbrook, supra note 1, at 475–76. See also Canadian S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard,
109 U.S. 527 (1883) (according comity to foreign judgment where party to be bound had notice
and opportunity to intervene). For a focus on procedural protections in comity analysis and their
role in rendering potential substantive differences in litigation outcomes acceptable, see In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). As discussed above, this procedural protection interpretation is also a plausible
reading of the Treco case. See supra note 135.
156. This conclusion is strengthened by the inclusion of an adequate protection clause in §
304(c) already, under § 304(c)(2) (providing “protection of claim holders in the United States
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Law’s repeated insistence that it focuses on procedural matters perhaps
suggests a procedural lens through which to interpret Article 21(2).157
Thus it is far from a foregone conclusion that this provision fully
revives territorialism in its reference to “adequate protection” of
domestic creditors.
Articles 28 and 29 present more of a real challenge to the nascent
choice-of-law rule regarding the automatic stay. Nevertheless, there are
still several reasons to suspect the effects of these provisions have also
been overstated. Article 28 provides that after a foreign main
proceeding has been recognized, a domestic bankruptcy proceeding may
nevertheless be opened with regard to the domestic assets. Furthermore,
Article 29 says that in such a situation, “the automatic stay and
suspension referred to in [Article 20(1)] shall be modified or
terminated…if inconsistent with the [domestic] proceeding.”158 The
Model Law thus allows a domestic creditor rights to file a full domestic
insolvency proceeding, even in the face of a proceeding underway in the
state of the center of the debtor’s main interests. It further allows that
local proceeding to vitiate the principal recognition effect of the foreign
main proceeding (the automatic application of a stay).
Articles 28 and 29 are not so dire to the universalist potential of the
Model Law’s automatic stay as this summary suggests for at least three
reasons. First, Articles 28 and 29 only apply when the domestic
proceeding is recognized on record as being a non-main proceeding.
That is, to invoke Articles 28 and 29 to “undo” the effects of the
automatic stay of Article 20, the domestic court must have already
decided under Article 15 that the center of the debtor’s main interests
falls outside its jurisdiction. Indeed, structurally, Article 28 states that
its operation occurs “[a]fter recognition of a foreign main
against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in [a] foreign proceeding”) 11
U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (2005). An expressio unis argument can be made that the Model Law’s
safeguard of “adequate protection” would more likely map to § 304(c)(2)’s prejudice and
inconvenience concerns than to § 304(c)(4)’s similarity of laws concerns.
157. See Berends, supra note 12, at 373–74 (suggesting “corruption” concerns prompted
safeguard clause). Consider also the theoretical goals of a bankruptcy regime discussed earlier in
this Article—specifically, the broad jurisdictional reach of bankruptcy laws to bind all
stakeholders to a compulsory resolution procedure. Presumably, a creditor required to relinquish
assets to a proceeding that does not guarantee collective debt resolution—the core of
bankruptcy—would be inadequately protected.
158. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 29(b)(ii). If an application for recognition of a foreign
main proceeding has been filed but not yet granted, Article 29 blocks such a stay preemptively.
See id. art. 29(a)(ii) (instructing that in such a situation Article 20 “does not apply”).
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proceeding.”159 This puts a domestic court more clearly on record in
deciding whether to frustrate a foreign proceeding that it concedes is
taking place in the center of the debtor’s main interests. While it is
arguably easy for courts to give comity short shrift in fuzzy situations,160
it is surely a different matter where the necessarily subordinate nexus to
the worldwide bankruptcy must be openly acknowledged.161
Accordingly, even if Articles 28 and 29 permit the “pre-eminence” of a
local proceeding, that local proceeding may well—in the interests of
comity that pre-exist and survive the Model Law—ultimately defer to
the foreign proceeding, perhaps self-conscious of an inferior regulatory
entitlement.162
Second, while the point may seem straightforward, Articles 28 and 29
only apply if and when a local proceeding is actually filed. Thus the
default scenario is for the automatic stay to enjoy full effect unless and
until a local proceeding is opened. This may be cold comfort if in
practice local proceedings are always filed by opportunistic creditors—
and there is some support for this likelihood.163 Nonetheless, the point
159. Id. art. 28.
160. See Tung, supra note 27, at 72, 100; cf. In re Starcom Servs. Corp. (Bankr. W.D. Wa.
1998) (converting a U.S. plenary proceeding into § 304 ancillary proceeding and entering
injunction requiring all creditors to pursue claims in Canadian plenary proceeding of Washington
state subsidiary of North American telecom company).
161. Professor Tung’s game theory approach suggests that ambiguity and its concomitant
“fuzzy commitments” create a heightened risk of defection and even enhance the “error noise.”
See id. at 80–82. Exposing “defection,” by removing ambiguity regarding which home state is
entitled to deference, reduces this noise.
162. Article 29 requires “cooperation and coordination” with the foreign court, and the
Enactment Guide makes clear that the initiation “of a local proceeding does not prevent or
terminate the recognition of a foreign proceeding. This principle is essential for achieving the
objectives of the Model Law in that it allows the court in the enacting State in all circumstances
to provide relief in favour of the foreign proceeding.” Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 189.
There is thus no reason why universalist states cannot fully defer to foreign main proceedings
under Article 29. Indeed, it is not even clear that the stay would dissolve automatically if the
foreign proceeding had been already recognized. Article 29(b)(ii) only provides that “the
stay…shall be modified or terminated…if inconsistent with the [local] proceeding.” MODEL
LAW, supra note 5, art. 29(b)(ii). A universalist state may well find an automatic stay, when it is
an ancillary jurisdiction, purely “consistent” with its local proceeding. Universalist states
consequently may remain universalist under Articles 28 and 29, just as territorialists may dig in.
The interesting case is the countries at the margin that could go either way. Such a country may
feel more pressure to defer if it must first recognize the foreign proceeding as being in the center
of the debtor’s main interests.
163. For example, most of the seminal cases involved filings in the relevant jurisdictions. See,
e.g., In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain
Freights, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988); In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996);
Re BCCI, Banque Arabe Internationale d’Investissement SA v. Morris [2001] 1 BCLC 263. We
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remains that, absent local interjection, a domestic automatic stay arises
by operation of a foreign bankruptcy, a novel concept to traditionally
territorialist jurisdictions. Furthermore, even if a local proceeding is
filed, the effects of recognizing the foreign main proceeding and any
orders (e.g., for turnover of assets) are not necessarily undone. They are
simply reassessed to check for “consistency” with the local proceeding.
As discussed above regarding adequate protection, the term
“consistency” is undefined and might be subject to varying
interpretations, including ones fostering international cooperation and
deference.
Finally, even if the automatic stay is modified or terminated by
initiation of a local proceeding under Articles 28 and 29, the effect of
recognizing the foreign proceeding as a main proceeding remains part of
the landscape of the ongoing transnational dispute. This has both a
direct and indirect consequence. Directly, it means that other provisions
of the Model Law that turn on the “main proceeding” designation still
remain in effect. For example, the presumption of insolvency created by
Article 31, (discussed in Section IV.B.1, infra), remains in force.
Indirectly, the ongoing effect of recognition reinforces the awkwardness
issue just discussed: it casts a pall over any subsequent judicial order of
the domestic court, which now emanates from a tribunal that has
acknowledged its inferior sovereign claim to control the global
insolvency dispute.164
The third reason the scope of Articles 28 and 29 might be overstated
is that the preserved “pre-eminence” of local proceedings is qualified,
not absolute. Specifically, while Article 28 accords the territorialist
creditor the right to initiate a plenary domestic insolvency proceeding in
the face of a foreign main proceeding, that right is constrained. Article
28 by its own terms limits the domestic proceeding in such a case to
covering only “the assets of the debtor that are located in [the local
state].”165 Thus, an Article 28 proceeding may only be territorialist in its

do not know, however, how many unremarkable cases with lower stakes there are.
164. In an earlier draft of the EU Regulation, which adopts a secondary proceeding approach
reminiscent of Articles 28 and 29, there was a proposed requirement that the foreign
representative from the foreign main proceeding authorize any filing of a secondary, local
proceeding. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 497.
165. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 28. To be precise, Article 28 permits the local
proceeding to reach beyond domestic assets, but only to aid foreign proceedings. Id.
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reach, even in a domestic jurisdiction with universalist bankruptcy
laws.166
On the one hand, this result might seem expected. After all, Article
28 is invoked only when a (presumably local) creditor resists the
universalist reach of a foreign main proceeding and seeks to shield
domestic assets from the ambit of the foreign proceeding’s (presumably
unfavorable, at least for that creditor) substantive bankruptcy laws. On
the other hand, if such a creditor is sufficiently advantaged by the
substantive priority rules of local law to bring a local proceeding under
Articles 28 and 29, then there is no reason why that creditor would not
want the reach of those favorable rules to be as expansive as possible
and thus encompass the debtor’s worldwide assets.167
In sum, a closer analysis of the Model Law reveals that the
supposedly unraveling effects of Articles 28 and 29 may be somewhat
overstated in their purported negation of the universalist choice-of-law
potential of Articles 2 and 20. Accordingly, the Model Law’s choice-oflaw rule—“centre of main interests,” which is presumed to be at the
debtor’s “registered office”—is a content-neutral rule that accords
important regulatory entitlements to the selected jurisdiction.168 While it
does not implement full-fledged universalism by compelling
distribution of global assets in accordance with the selected
jurisdiction’s substantive bankruptcy provisions under a “one law”
approach, the Model Law nevertheless provides a functioning choiceof-law rule for transnational insolvency disputes, the starting theoretical
foundation of a universalist regime.

B.

Acceptance of Outcome Differences

The second way in which the Model Law foments universalism is by
embracing the paradigm’s other theoretical anchor, namely, pushing
enacting states into accepting some cession of regulatory sovereignty in
166. Bob Wessels makes this observation regarding the EU Regulation’s analogues to
Articles 28 and 29. Wessels, supra note 6, at 499.
167. This happened in Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V.,
310 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2002), where a U.S. creditor argued, to an American court, that its
claim should be subjected to (favorable) Belgian bankruptcy law when there were two parallel
bankruptcy proceedings opened in the United States and Belgium. See id. (reversing injunction
that barred U.S. creditor from pursuing this claim in Belgium). Compare this case with In re
Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d 186 B.R. 807
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) where British administrators sought the
application of American avoidance law in an American proceeding to transfers otherwise valid
under British law.
168. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 16(3).
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the transnational insolvency realm. I offer two examples of this from the
Model Law: Articles 31 and 14. What is significant about these articles
is that they are not part of the core provisions of the Model Law
discussed above that pertain to the stay upon recognition of a foreign
proceeding. Rather, they are more to the periphery of the Law.

1.

Article 31

Article 16 of the Model Law adopts certain presumptions. Some of
these presumptions affect purely procedural matters. For example,
Article 16(2) empowers recognizing courts to presume that documents
submitted in support of an application for recognition are authentic
without resort to cumbersome methods of legalization.169 Other
presumptions are more substantive. Significant for the choice-of-law
rule is Article 16(3), which provides that the debtor’s registered office is
presumed to be its center of main interests.170
The Model Law also contains another, arguably hidden presumption
that curiously is not located with the other presumptions in Article 16. It
is in Article 31.171 This presumption does not apply universally, but only
to foreign main proceedings. It provides: “In the absence of evidence to
the contrary, recognition of a foreign main proceeding is, for the
purpose of commencing a [domestic insolvency proceeding], proof that
the debtor is insolvent.”172 This presumption is significant because in
many jurisdictions some threshold degree of financial distress must be
shown before a debtor may enjoy the benefits of insolvency
protection.173 These range from the “cessation of payments” test in the
Netherlands,174 to the more traditional “balance sheet insolvency” test in
Canada.175 By contrast, the American system allows for debtor self-

169. Id. art. 16(2) (“The court is entitled to presume that documents submitted in support of
the application for recognition are authentic, whether or not they have been legalized.”).
170. Id. art. 16(3) (“In the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or
habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the centre of the debtor’s main
interests.”).
171. Berends suggests that this is because the presumption only takes effect after recognition.
See Berends, supra note 12, at 392–95.
172. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 31.
173. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 194 (canvassing different tests).
174. See Berends, supra note 12, at 393 (discussing the Dutch Insolvency Act’s two unpaid
debts test).
175. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at n.71 (discussing § 2(1) of the Canadian Bankruptcy &
Insolvency Act’s definition of a “bankrupt”).
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filing, policed indirectly by a good-faith requirement.176 Article 31’s
presumption of insolvency thus speaks to the eligibility of a debtor to
enter the insolvency system.177
By creating this eligibility-related presumption, Article 31 mandates
a domestic state—at least to the extent of a rebuttable presumption—to
accept a foreign state’s decision that the requirements of “protectionworthiness” have been met.178 Indeed, the compelled decision reinforces
the choice-of-law rule central to the Model Law, because the
sovereignty-suppressing presumption is only enjoyed by foreign states
where the pending bankruptcy is a foreign main proceeding under
Article 2’s center of main interests test.
What makes the presumption still more remarkable is that it is
enjoyed by any primary jurisdiction under the center of main interests
test, even those jurisdictions that have no threshold insolvency
requirement for filing under domestic law. It is one thing for a Canadian
court to suppress its balance sheet insolvency test for the Dutch
cessation of payments test: they are arguably two roads to the same goal
of ensuring a state of financial distress has been demonstrated. It is quite
another thing for a Canadian court to suppress its entire eligibility
requirement—by “presuming” that the debtor is insolvent and hence
eligible for Canadian bankruptcy protection—by virtue of an American
proceeding that requires no such showing. To be sure, an easy answer is
that the presumption is only an inference that can be deflated with
“evidence to the contrary” by a skeptical Canadian suitor.179 But the
176. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) requires that a reorganization plan be proposed “in good faith” as
a precondition to confirmation. See, e.g., In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 31 B.R. 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Legal Theory: The Implied
Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV.
919 (1991).
177. See UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part II, 24th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.54/ADD.1 (2001), paras. 103–11 (discussing various eligibility screens
used in bankruptcy systems) [hereinafter Draft Legislative Guide, Part II].
178. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 31. To be precise, it foists this acceptance upon states
that have “insolvency” as an eligibility threshold to bankruptcy protection. States such as the
United States sacrifice little with such a concession. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 196
(“For the national laws where proof that the debtor is insolvent is not required for the
commencement of insolvency proceedings, the presumption established in article 31 may be of
little practical significance.”).
179. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 31. The comment on the rebuttable nature of this
presumption in the Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 197, seems almost defensive about
Article 31’s incursion onto sovereignty and reminds that “the court of the enacting state is not
bound by the decision of the foreign court, and local criteria for demonstrating insolvency remain
operative, as is clarified by the words ‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary.’” That local
criteria remain active does not mean that they survive intact. An interesting corpus of European

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art36

44

Pottow:

2005]

A M ODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY

979

easy answer ignores the effects of presumptions in creating evidentiary
hurdles to bias preferred outcomes.180 There is also arguably an
expressive function to delineating the status quo.181
The theoretical import of Article 31 is difficult to overstate. Its
message is unabashedly universalist: one state should accept another
state’s assessment that eligibility for bankruptcy filing has been met,
even from those jurisdictions that do not invest great stock in a financial
distress requirement.182 Moreover, Article 31’s scope is broad. Even a
“pre-eminent” local proceeding under Articles 28 and 29 does not
escape its reach. Although Articles 28 and 29 permit the filing of a local
proceeding in the face of a concession that another jurisdiction houses
the center of the debtor’s main interests, that otherwise plenary local
proceeding is partially constrained by being required to accept the main
jurisdiction’s assessment that eligibility for filing has been met under
Article 31.

litigation is unfolding on when and how “evidence to the contrary” can rebut the presumption,
which is also contained in the EU Regulation. See, e.g., Enron Directo SL ((High Ct. Ch. Div.,
July 4, 2002) (oral decision of Lightman, J.) (holding Spanish-incorporated subsidiary of the
Enron Group that had all its activities conducted and headquarters situated at Enron House in
London had its center of main interests in the United Kingdom rather than Spain), discussed in
Ian F. Fletcher, The Challenge of Change: First Experiences of Life Under the EC Regulation on
Insolvency Proceedings in the U.K. (INSOL Working Paper (2003) (on file with author).
180. See Note, Shifting Burdens of Persuasion in Employment Discrimination Litigation. 109
HARV. L. REV. 1579 (1996). This observation can be cast as a corollary of the Coase Theorem.
Note that the burden of this specific issue is important. The assignment of risk in demonstrating
insolvency implicates complex valuation and accounting issues in many bankruptcy cases.
181. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 608 n.144 (2003) (“[C]ourts tend to regard state-created defaults as
presumptively fair or efficient.”).
182. By framing Article 31 as an insolvency presumption, as opposed to a more explicit
“eligibility” presumption, the Model Law might be making a further, even stronger normative
statement on the triviality of the insolvency requirement as an eligibility screen. This is because
Article 31 does not foist a presumption upon recognizing states with regard to all eligibility
screens. For example, the recognition of a foreign main proceeding does not generate a
presumption that the debtor has filed in good faith. The Model Law has thus arguably created a
hierarchy of bankruptcy eligibility screens, necessarily classifying the insolvency requirement as
“more suppressible” than other eligibility screens. This possibility is reinforced by the disdain of
the NAFTA reformers toward the insolvency screen. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 17
(“Technical details of insolvency and ‘entrance requirements’ aside, the law in each country is
concerned with situations in which the debtor is (or threatens shortly to be) not paying its debts as
they become due.”). On the other hand, UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide endorses
eligibility screens in insolvency laws. See Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177.
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Article 14

While Article 31 provides a direct example of universalism in the
Model Law by suppressing one state’s laws in deference to the main
state’s, Article 14 goes even further. It compels an actual harmonization
of important notice provisions of domestic bankruptcy laws. If
universalism requires temporary cession of sovereignty by ancillary
jurisdictions, harmonization arguably requires absolute relinquishment.
This is because universalism rotates which jurisdiction’s substantive
bankruptcy laws will govern. Compelled harmonization, by contrast,
requires all jurisdictions to follow one invariable rule. The jurisdictions
that do not subscribe to the eventual victor rule must forever give up
their own policy views on the matter.183
Article 14 of the Model Law covers the notice to foreign creditors
that must be given when an insolvency proceeding is commenced in an
enacting jurisdiction. The provision begins innocuously enough as an
antidiscrimination injunction requiring states to give notice to foreign
creditors when notice is given to domestic creditors.184 The article
continues, however, to impose the requirement that notice be given
individually to the foreign creditors: “Such notification shall be made to
the foreign creditors individually, unless the court considers that, under
the circumstances, some other form of notification would be more
appropriate.”185
This is significant. Some domestic regimes require individual notice
to creditors, but others permit common publication.186 By mandating
individual notice, the Model Law takes a stance in the debate over
offsetting costs and benefits of differing forms of notice. Again, in
keeping with the expected and repeated agnosticism of the Model Law
towards harmonization, one would have expected Article 14 simply to
183. Strictly speaking, harmonization does not require suppression of sovereignty if the
subscribing states agree spontaneously to a new, harmonized standard. But the Model Law’s
“adjunct” status—that it can be enacted alongside a country’s preexisting domestic insolvency
code—anticipates that enacting states may not want to change their preexisting laws.
184. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 14(1):
Whenever under [domestic insolvency law] notification is to be given to creditors in this
State, such notification shall also be given to the known creditors that do not have
addresses in this State. The court may order that appropriate steps be taken with a view
to notifying any creditors whose address is not yet known.
185. Id. art. 14(2). The “discretion [reserved] to allow other forms of notification” permits
flexibility for situations where, for example, “another way of notifying foreign creditors…is
equally effective but less cumbersome.” Berends, supra note 12, at 347.
186. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 107 (noting domestic notice laws ranging from
individual notice to local publication to affixing notices on courthouse doors).
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have required the same degree of notice that all other creditors enjoy
under domestic bankruptcy law, respecting the sovereign rights of each
state to select its notice system of preference. Article 14(2)’s decision to
mandate individual notice is striking, almost pushy.187
Furthermore, Article 14(3) goes a step further and actually spells out
specific items for inclusion in that individual notice.
[The] notification shall: (a) [i]ndicate a reasonable time period
for filing claims and specify the place for their filing; (b)
[i]ndicate whether secured creditors need to file their secured
claims; and (c) [c]ontain any other information required to be
included in such a notification to creditors pursuant to the law[s]
of [the enacting] State.188
The structure of Article 14(3) clarifies that subsections (a) and (b) are
additive, harmonized notice requirements to domestic notice law
already incorporated under subsection (c). Article 14(3) foists these
notice requirements onto all enacting states, regardless of their preexisting laws, thus forcing further harmonization. Remarkably, Article
14 applies to any domestic proceeding involving foreign creditors, even
the insolvency of a domestic debtor with all its assets located within the
domestic state’s jurisdiction.189 This expands the Model Law’s reach
beyond the paradigmatic conception of a “transnational” insolvency.190
If the purpose of the Model Law is to facilitate resolution of potential
conflicts of laws among nations with competing claims to regulate an
insolvency, then Article 14 has no place in applying to a “purely
domestic” insolvency, i.e., one in which only one sovereign’s laws

187. The Enactment Guide invokes fairness and pragmatism to justify the forced
harmonization, noting that the more inexpensive and parochial forms of notice, such as posting on
the courthouse door, prejudice distant creditors (as international creditors are wont to be). See id.
¶ 107. The aggressiveness of Article 14 is striking in light of approaches taken by other
procedural international instruments, such as the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
188. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 14(3).
189. See id. arts. 1(d), 14(1).
190. Cf. CAPE TOWN CONVENTION, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN
MOBILE EQUIPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
(UNIDROIT), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2002/CRP.3 (2001). art. 50(1) [hereinafter CAPE TOWN
CONVENTION] (permitting states not to apply the Convention to “internal transactions”).
Professor Mooney thinks international reforms should not shy away from revising purely
domestic law. See Mooney, supra note 48, at 32–33 & n.51.
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could possibly govern.191 Article 14 does precisely that by covering
notice to foreign creditors in such purely domestic proceedings.
This seemingly unprincipled extension of the Model Law’s scope is
actually fully consonant with the first principles of universalism theory:
it fosters the increased acceptance of outcome differences by requiring
the suppression of regulatory sovereignty over bankruptcy notice laws
(at least within those jurisdictions whose pre-existing laws do not match
Article 14’s prescriptions). Moreover, the effects of Article 14’s
harmonization may be dynamic. If certain notice rules are mandated for
foreign creditors in all proceedings, there may well be a spillover effect
into domestic creditor notice provisions.192 Some domestic provisions
may well be upgraded to comport with the higher standard of notice
enjoyed by the foreign creditors in domestic proceedings compelled by
the Model Law.193 Thus, Article 14 constitutes a brazen example of the
Model Law creeping well beyond its purportedly sovereignty-respecting
effects into the realm of harmonization.
Articles 14 and 31 are just two examples of the Model Law’s
universalist leanings, and they are not unique. The Model Law contains
myriad other instances of latent harmonization. The Preamble, for
example, includes a pronouncement of normative policy.194 It states that
191. Article 1(d) of the Model Law expressly extends its scope to otherwise domestic
proceedings where “creditors or other interested persons in a foreign state have an interest,”
which provides the doctrinal foundation for Article 14(3). The Enactment Guide sheds little light
on this jurisdictional stretch, which sits in tension with the theoretical justification of resolving
competing claims to regulatory jurisdiction by co-equal sovereigns.
192. Indeed, UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide, Part II endorses such a heightened notice
standard. See Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, rec. 18.
193. See Colloquy, supra note 2, at 2274 (“[C]ountries could learn from the experiences of
other nations and update their law accordingly.”); cf. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Extraterritorial
Impact of Choice-of-Law Rules for Non-United States Debtors Under Revised U.C.C. Article 9
and a New Proposal for International Harmonization, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND
INSOLVENCY (eds. Michael Bridge and Robert Stevens) 195 (2001) (supporting such a
harmonizing potential in secured transactions reform that will encourage minority view states to
“wake up, smell the coffee, and reach some of the [superior] conclusions that lawmakers reached
in [majority view states] many years ago”). Professor Tung discusses a related idea of “passport”
extraterritorial transnational regimes, where a form of pluralist universalism is followed (which
he and others call a “passport” system) in which a multinational commercial actor carries the
substantive regulatory laws of its “home” jurisdiction when it “travels” abroad (like carrying a
passport), but insists that there be some degree of baseline harmonization among the participating
states. See Tung, supra note 25, at 379. This is another expression of the “rough similarity” that
Professor Westbrook says is likely required for there to be meaningful cession of sovereignty by
deferring jurisdictions under modified universalism. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2291.
194. Inherent in this assessment is the contention that by including matters of normative
policy, enacting states that disagree with those policies (unless they delete them from the version
of the text they enact) have modified their own policies, yielding once again a degree of
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the goals of the Model Law include promoting the objectives of:
cooperation between domestic and foreign courts in cross-border
insolvencies; greater legal certainty for trade and investment; fair and
efficient administration; protection and maximization of the value of the
debtor’s assets; and facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled
businesses.195 These goals could safely be characterized as
uncontroversial, even accurate summaries reflecting general principles
of many of the world’s insolvency laws.196 The Preamble’s further
insistence that the objective of the last goal (rescue) is to “preserv[e]
employment” strays into the normative.197 It touches on a hotly
contested debate of substantive bankruptcy policy: whether insolvency
laws should seek to save otherwise economically inefficient firms from
failure for salutary collateral purposes such as promoting full
employment.198 Needless to say, there is no international consensus
here.
In summary, while not overtly trumpeting its universalist
proclivities—and wisely so, given the consensus-dooming touchiness of
the ongoing debate—the Model Law actually contains several
provisions, albeit at the margin, which begin to “nudge” states along the
way to ceding some sovereignty. On these limited matters, they accept
the outcome differences that accompany forced deference to the home
regulatory sovereignty. Although of course a Preamble is usually not law itself, states may accord
it some force. For example, in the enactment of the Model Law in the United States, Congress
incorporated the Preamble as a legislative declaration. 11 U.S.C.S. § 1501 (2005).
195. Preamble to MODEL LAW, supra note 5.
196. See generally UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7.
197. Preamble to MODEL LAW, supra note 5, subs. (e).
198. See Baird, supra note 22, at 580–88. Professor Baird charts a fundamental divide
between economically focused bankruptcy scholars (whom he calls proceduralists) and more
traditional bankruptcy scholars. The latter embrace the distributional potential for bankruptcy
laws, while the former do not. Illustrating this divide, Baird distinguishes between “economic”
distress, which indicates a firm’s inefficient deployment of assets, and “financial distress,” which
implicates an otherwise healthy firm’s temporary dislocation due to an inopportune capital
structure. The former group of scholars, Baird contends, see bankruptcy law’s proper goals as
limited to financial distress, whereas the latter group accepts both financial and economic distress
as within the legitimate purview of bankruptcy.
One of the Model Law’s drafters has recognized this potential for dispute with subsection (e)
of the Preamble. See Berends, supra note 12, at 323–24 (noting that Dutch law, according to
recent precedent, would likely accord higher protection to preserving employment than
maximizing value of the debtor’s assets, by realizing a lower value for a business in a manner that
preserves full employment, a notion that translates roughly as a protection of “social interests”).
Baird would see this as clearly embracing a traditionalist approach to bankruptcy policy and thus
on one side of a possibly unbridgeable chasm. The Enactment Guide, supra note 100, makes no
specific comment on this normative component of the Preamble.
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jurisdiction’s laws, and in some instances harmonize their discrepant
laws outright. Moreover, the trigger for at least one of these areas of
nudging is the choice-of-law rule (the center of the debtor’s main
interests). The interactive combination of these two constructs—choice
of law and acceptance of outcome differences—reveals the Model
Law’s embrace, despite its purported neutrality, of both of
universalism’s conceptual foundations. Therefore at a theoretical level
of inquiry, although it requires some probing below the surface, we can
see the Model Law as universalist.

V.

MODELING TRANSNATIONAL REFORM: PROCEDURAL
INCREMENTALISM

The previous Section demonstrated that the Model Law fosters a
nascent form of universalism. This “proto-universalism” exhibits two
important characteristics. First, it is not a direct adoption of the
universalist model but rather an indirect embrace of universalism’s
theoretical underpinnings. Second, the universalism of the Model Law
is not overt. Indeed, it has eluded most academic commentary to date.
Accordingly, the Model Law’s proto-universalism can be described as
operating below the radar. This Section builds upon this characterization
and constructs a model to explain the Model Law’s success at garnering
international consensus. As mentioned above, the Model Law’s success
can be found both in the creation of a coherent model law for crossborder insolvencies, an accomplishment in its own right, and in the
actual passage of domestic legislation in several countries. Both of these
demonstrate reform qua reform (something where before there was
nothing). But the Model Law also advances universalism when,
paradoxically, there remains ongoing vitality to the universalismterritorialism debate and continuing skepticism over universalism. We
might call this “unlikely” or “surprising” reform: consensus in a state of
flux. It is both these levels of success of the Model Law that I seek to
explain.199

A.

The Appeal of the Model Laws

The Model Law appears to be enjoying a warm reception from
enacting states, a marked departure from the coolness offered most of its
199. Again, I defer participation in the normative debate for another day, but I will note the
majority position of scholars in favor of universalism and thus add the further label of “happy” to
the reform. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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predecessors. One explanation of the Model Law’s comparative success
might be the use of the mechanism of a model law itself. A model law
permits provision-by-provision treatment. This in turn escapes the allor-nothing rigidity of treaty adoption. While of course the terms of a
treaty are negotiated and tailored by the international parties involved,
the difficulty of drafting a comprehensive treaty is multiplied when one
moves from the bilateral to the multilateral context.200 By contrast, a
model law permits the myriad differences of opinion that might
otherwise render the negotiation of a multinational treaty impossible to
be deferred to the enactment stage.201 Moreover, the opus of the model
law exists on its own as a discrete document of potential law,202 even if
each state ends up rejecting a provision or two. As Professor Mooney
has observed:
In many respects the process of harmonization through an
international convention is much more cumbersome and
unwieldy than the model law paradigm. An international
convention normally would be sponsored by an intergovernmental organization, with all the usual formality and
delay. The road from an idea, to a study, to successful meetings
of governmental experts, and eventually to a diplomatic
conference may be long, winding, and rocky. A model law, on
the other hand, need not have explicit or unqualified approval of
any governmental or intergovernmental organization, inasmuch
as it is itself not a law at all but only a “model.”203
200. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002).
201. See Westbrook, supra note 105, at 570–71 (noting that UNCITRAL decided to opt for a
model law because “[t]he achievement of a treaty would be a greater accomplishment, but much
more difficult”). I leave aside, as do the other bankruptcy commentators, the issue of reservations
in the treaty ratification process.
202. “A model law is better than an unratified convention.” Berends, supra note 12, at 319
(noting the hesitance of the Model Law’s drafters to push for an international treaty in light the of
failure of the Istanbul Convention).
203. Mooney, supra note 193, at 202. Curiously, Professor Mooney then backs away from his
endorsements of model laws, over fear that they can be altered excessively (perhaps distorted) at
the domestic enactment stage. He thus prefers the “take it or leave it” approach of an international
convention. Id. He raises a good point, but even if I shared this preference for tough love, I am
not sure the traditional alternatives will solve his concerns. For example, an international
convention on secured transactions “will find it necessary to provide alternatives to accommodate
local, domestic interests that may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,” as he himself concedes.
Id. Thus I am not sure conventions, at least as he envisions, will have any more agenda-setting
power than model laws. His other concern of model laws goes more generally to the interests of
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One might argue that the Model Law’s reliance on follow-up
enactment largely undermines its binding potential.204 But this analysis
is too quick, for several reasons. First, one can empirically look to
jurisdictions that have begun the enactment process to see how much of
the Model Law becomes adopted. These initial results look promising.
For example, in the United States, freshly enacted Title 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code codifies the scheme of the Model Law virtually
verbatim.205 And other countries that have completed domestic
enactment have, with some inevitable exceptions, left the core terms of
the Model Law for the most part undisturbed.206
Second, one can repeat the observation that the enactment of
something is better than the enactment of nothing.207 The all-or-nothing
the “private legislatures” that design them. See id. at 12 (distrusting the use of model laws to
harmonize secured transactions legislation over fear that local bankruptcy professors and
practitioners will “have little interest in reforms that would render obsolete their lifelong efforts to
master the esoteric”).
204. See generally Scott, supra note 144, at 1031 (“The ALI and NCCUSL believed that this
consolidation of commercial law into a single statutory scheme would enable them to sell the
entire project to the states on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis thus avoiding the selective enactment that
had occurred with earlier uniform acts.”) (citation omitted).
205. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S.256, 109th
Cong. Tit. 14 (2005).
206. See generally Westbrook, supra note 13 (discussing the approach most countries have
taken to adopt the Model Law provisions). For example, Eritrea has adopted the Model Law
virtually wholesale. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status: 1997—
Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). New Zealand is poised to do the
same (the Model Law’s adoption having been recommended by the Law Commission of New
Zealand to the Ministry of Justice). See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 30. The United Kingdom also
appears ready to follow suit. Id. South Africa’s adoption had a qualifier injected about reciprocity.
Id. at 29. Most interesting has been the “sticking points” in Japan and Mexico. In Japan, a
traditionally territorialist jurisdiction, a reciprocity requirement was not added, but two
noteworthy changes were included. First, the Japanese blanch at the messy idea of parallel
proceedings and so in the event of an Article 28 parallel proceeding arising after a recognition of
a foreign main proceeding, the Japanese version of the Model Law requires dismissal of either the
foreign recognition or the main petition. Id. at 24–25. Second, the stay under article 20 is not
automatic (a potential blow for universalists), but the stay affecting secured creditors under article
27 is to be in accordance with the main jurisdiction’s laws (a boon for universalists—exportation
of the center of main interest’s stay laws). Id. at 25–26. As for Mexico, the alterations are less
marked than Japan, except, for purposes of this analysis, the retention of the insolvency
“verification visit” that is triggered in all Mexican bankruptcies. “Decreto por el que se aprueba la
Ley de Concursos Mercantiles reforma el articulo ochenta y ocho de la Ley Organica del Poder
Judicial de la Federacion,’’ D.O., 12 May 2000, art. 293 [hereinafter Mexican Insolvency Law].
Yet Mexico adopted article 31 of the Model Law, so its interaction with the verification visit
practice under preexisting Mexican law is, in the understatement of Professor Westbrook, “not
clear.” Westbrook, supra note 8, at 28. Perhaps the verifier must presume insolvency in her visit
if an ancillary proceeding is opened in Mexico and a foreign main proceeding is recognized.
207. Berends, supra note 12, at 319.
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nature of treaty ratification poses considerable risk of nothing (or
ominous signals through reservations). A model law’s reliance on
provision-by-provision scrutiny may allow for substantial deviation, but
at least reduces the risk of outright rejection.208 Finally, one can point to
the agenda-setting effect of the Model Law’s structured template. By
emphasizing a strong desire for complete enactment,209 and by singling
out specific prescriptions where alternative rules are proposed,210 the
Model Law both signals an intention for minimal deviation and cabins
the areas on which objectively reasonable disagreement might be
anticipated.211 A state may wish to deviate from the proposed majority
text and adopt one of the alternative provisions for those areas where the
Model Law’s drafters provide variations. That state might be respected
as exercising its rights to take the minority view. A state seeking to
deviate from one of the provisions for which the Model Law proposes
one and only one text faces a more internationally face-threatening act.
It must go on record as finding infirmity in one of the Model Law’s
provisions that was not deemed worthy of preparing alternatives. Such a
dissenting state must accordingly fight an implicit assumption that
reasonable states could not (or should not) have disagreed.212 This peer
pressure casts considerable doubt on the first-blush concern that a model
law leaves states truly “free” to incorporate or reject each provision at
will. Therefore it is certainly possible that the Model Law’s status, qua
model law, may well in significant part account for its success at

208. Id. (“A convention is an ‘all-or-nothing’ instrument, a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ text. The risk
that too many countries would not ‘take it’ was too great [for the drafters of the Model Law].”).
209. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 12 (“Therefore, in order to achieve a
satisfactory degree of harmonization and certainty, it is recommended that the States make as few
changes as possible in incorporating the model law into their legal systems.”).
210. See, e.g., id. at 449–50 (proposing an alternative version of Article 13(2)—the
substantive antidiscrimination clause against foreign creditors—permitting discrimination against
foreign tax and social security claims, as do several domestic insolvency laws).
211. In fairness, this approach is not exclusive to model laws. The Aircraft Equipment
Protocol, discussed infra, has an Alternative A and Alternative B regarding article XI, which its
commentary describes as the “hard” and “soft” alternatives. See Mooney, supra note 48, at 37–
38. These alternatives are helpful where, for example, there are structural differences between
legal systems, such as a common law versus civil law approach.
212. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide does not propound a full model law, but does
offer more abstracted provision-by-provision legislative proposals, and occasionally resorts to
“minority” recommendations in areas where there is a strong tradition of legal difference. See
generally UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7.
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garnering international support. But there may be something more at
work.213

B.

Acclimation

The Model Law’s status qua model law cannot be the sole reason for
its success, because the model law format had been tried in the past and
failed. Accordingly, there must be something about the specific scope
and nature of the Model Law that facilitated its success in an
environment where the universalism–territorialism disagreement
survives.214 What distinguishes the Model Law is that it chose an
incrementalist approach, whereas other, less successful predecessors
pursued a more ambitious agenda.215 Under the modest approach of the
Model Law’s proto-universalism, skeptical territorialist states might not
have been overwhelmed by the complete subjugation of regulatory
sovereignty and acceptance of outcome differences demanded by
universalism. Instead, the Model Law accords states the chance to
desensitize gradually to other states’ bankruptcy systems; acclimation is
permitted.216
My chief claim is therefore that the Model Law takes the soft sell of
incrementalism over the harder core, one-step plunge into universalism
that was tried, and failed, with previous international efforts such as
MIICA. Recall that the universalism model rests upon a tolerance for
the acceptance of outcome differences by reluctant sovereign states. If
that is so, then there are at least two possible routes a universalist reform
213. Model laws and treaties need not necessarily be exclusive in format. For example, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposes “model bilateral
treaties” in the tax context and has had some success with this approach. OECD, Article 26 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, at http://www.oecd.org/document/53/
0,2340,en_2649_33747_33614197_1_1_1_1,00.html (2004) (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) (“Article
26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides the most widely accepted legal basis for
bilateral exchange of information for tax purposes. More than 2,000 bilateral treaties are based on
the Model Convention.”).
214. As one court’s testy comments reminded in rejecting a universalist request for turnover
(preceding the Model Law), “[a Canadian court’s] function is not simply to rubber stamp
commands issuing from the foreign court of the primary bankruptcy.” Holt Cargo Sys. v. ABC
Containerline N.V. (Trustees of), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 907, ¶ 33.
215. See, e.g., MIICA, supra note 94 (proposing a full-fledged universalist regime).
216. Writing about what became the EU Regulation (a cousin of the Model Law), Professor
Fletcher underscores the sensitivity over sovereignty that inclines many states against
universalism. The Regulation’s approach was thus “pragmatic—in that it recognizes the limits
beyond which sovereign states are unlikely to be prepared to go at the present stage of European
integration, even for the sake of procuring a more structured approach to handling cross-border
insolvencies in an EU context….” Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124.
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effort might have taken. The first is a flooding approach, where the state
that is anxious about giving up regulatory sovereignty over a bankruptcy
is inundated with foreign policies and required to capitulate on all
matters at once when a foreign jurisdiction is chosen to govern. In
bankruptcy, this would mean ceding controlling law to the “prickly”
avoidance, distribution, and priority rules of the foreign jurisdiction.
Reformers would thus hope for the best, gambling that the flooded state
would emerge from this cathartic relinquishment of sovereignty and see
the light of Transactional Gain and other such theorized benefits of
universalism.217 The enlightened state should swim toward the
universalist shore as a new convert. The downside, of course, of such an
approach is that the inundated state may simply be overwhelmed by
yielding complete control to the potentially strange bankruptcy laws of a
foreign country with highly different normative content. Following the
analogy, this would mean that the state drowns and withdraws from the
universalist project altogether, seeking refuge in the familiar comfort of
territorialism, and the reform effort collapses.218
The second, less risky but more protracted path is one of systematic
desensitization, where the cold water of universalism is adjusted to
gradually with baby steps. Under this approach, universalism is
presented with regard to discrete matters, with a choice-of-law rule
requiring relinquishment of control over some, but not all, elements of a
transnational dispute. This is the route taken by the Model Law. To be
sure, it is a less direct approach to reform, because it requires time,
patience, and quite probably multiple stages of increasing exposure to
its paradigm, as opposed to the potentially more satisfying but more
volatile all-or-nothing approach.219
217. See Mooney, supra note 48, at 30 (admonishing reform-sensitive states to wake up,
smell the coffee); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124 (acknowledging that compromise
approaches may “draw the wrathful ire of purists”).
218. Consider the skittishness of states over discussing avoidance rules in bankruptcy.
Deliberately omitting them from the Cape Town Convention on Immovable Equipment, Professor
Mooney explains:
As an active participant in the drafting and negotiation process for the Convention over
several years, I clearly recall that the decision not to attempt to define [preferences and
fraudulent transfers] was a deliberate one. The consensus view was that insolvency
systems so differed from one another that it would not be feasible to fashion definitions
that would adequately mesh with all systems.
Mooney, supra note 48, at 36 n.85. Consider also that the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Credit Transfers followed the U.S. approach of Article 4A of the Uniform
Commercial Code so closely that it alienated non-American participants. No state has enacted it.
219. Even those who prefer to jump into the lake and get it over with, and who denigrate their
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This gradual route also learns from the unique theoretical
characteristics of bankruptcy law discussed earlier that make it
especially contentious at the international level. The deeply invasive,
broadly reaching, and thornily normative nature of a bankruptcy regime
is divided and conquered by this incrementalism. While the Model Law
goes for the first two dimensions (by displacing pre-existing bankruptcy
laws and binding all creditors and property) it deliberately falls short on
the third axis (by avoiding the normative priority rules and pushing only
on matters at the periphery of bankruptcy). Thus it permits some
acclimation as an interim measure before pursuing subsequent reforms,
and it does so by picking the easier battles first.220
Furthermore, the oblique nature of this incrementalist approach
allows the potential to capture some skeptical territorialist states at the
margin. These marginal territorialists fall into two camps. The first
camp holds the putative reformer territorialists—the territorialists who
are dubious at giving up their sovereignty and who worry that
universalism’s theorized benefits may be overstated, but who
nevertheless might be willing to give it a try, if it were possible to do so
without going all in. These states can subscribe to the Model Law’s
limited universalism, confident in the knowledge that if the water gets
too cold they can always stop where they are and go back. If they go
back, the universalists are arguably no worse off, and if they go on—
because upon exposure they find the water not so bad—then the
universalists have gained another convert, a convert who may well have
never considered conversion had it required an all-or-nothing leap.221
The second camp that might be swept in by the Model Law’s
indirectness are the diehard territorialists who refuse to even try
universalism, convinced of its undesirability. Here, then, the Model
Law’s design of fostering universalism in tangential sections somewhat
removed from its core provisions may well be deliberately conceived to
slowpoke colleagues who prefer to wade in, must concede that a latent danger with their more
dramatic approach is the occasional heart attack.
220. This is especially why the Model Law might be considered “functionalist.” Its gradual
advancement is on arguably more technical matters.
221. Indeed, there may even be a subset of these universalism experimenters who wish their
experimentation to remain secret, perhaps because of being locked into previously stated
positions defending territorialism. This group would enjoy the convoluted and ambiguous
interaction between Article 20 and Articles 28 and 29. Because of the “one hand-other hand”
granting and taking away of universalism by the interaction of these articles, the outwardly
territorialist state could always point to Articles 28 and 29 to assert the supremacy of sovereignty
and preeminence of local proceedings while at the same time experimenting with the Model
Law’s universalism. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts. 20, 28–29.
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have an obfuscating or distracting effect. Such states may not appreciate
the latent universalism embedded within the Model Law until after they
have been subjected to it at a mild level (and then may find that it is not
that bad after all, or, to remain within the ongoing analogy, that after
allowing themselves to be lightly splashed through lack of attention, the
water is not nearly so cold as had at first been feared). Had the Model
Law’s foray into universalism been on a more central matter—say, the
bankruptcy priority rules—then this distracted camp of states might
have sat up, paid more attention, and dug into their territorialist roots.222
The success of the Model Law in the second, “surprising” sense—at
advancing universalism in the face of continuing support for
territorialism by some states—might be explained in part by looking at
these marginal states. Their approval of the Model Law through their
respective UNCITRAL delegates and presumable follow-up enactment
as domestic legislation evinces a willingness to accept a limited
exposure to universalism as a good-faith experiment (or a mild
deception) for their own benefit. This perhaps is how the Model Law
was able to advance the agenda of universalism in the face of unsettled
consensus. To be clear, I am not suggesting that territorialists were
hoodwinked into enacting the Model Law. Whatever one’s views of
legislators, I am skeptical that a law premised upon widespread
international deception is likely to prove stable. As Llewellyn observed,
covert tools are never reliable ones.223 (In any event, I have now just
“outed” the Model Law by publishing this Article.) Rather, my
proposition is that there may be some states that let their guards down
because of the non-threatening nature of the universalist provisions in
the Law—states that may well be surprised to find themselves moved
slightly more along the universalism continuum and, upon realizing
where they are, unlikely to move back.224
To summarize the initial theoretical model, my primary claim is that
the Model Law’s success at receiving warm international reception

222. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
223. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 363 (1960).
224. Cf. Tung, supra note 27, at 60–65 (arguing that rational states will become stuck in a
prisoner’s dilemma and never embrace universalism even if they want to). Indeed, were the
Model Law more brazenly universalist, it is unlikely the states’ guards would have been lowered
sufficiently. Belaboring the analogy, one might be able to distract someone afraid of cold water
long enough to splash them lightly; it is unlikely one could distract them sufficiently to have them
accidentally walk into a lake. Their guards will lower in non-threatening or confusing
environments—but only so far. The benefits of obfuscation are extant but marginal.
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stems not exclusively from its status as a model law qua model law, but
rather from the incrementalism inherent in its overall design and scope.
Rather than seeking complete universalism, the Model Law retained
some territorialist components, but ultimately inserted some baby
steps—in discrete, unassuming areas—towards universalism. This
seemingly convoluted design and unambitious scope was actually the
key to breaking the reform loggerhead in international bankruptcy. The
back-and-forth interaction between Article 20 and Articles 28 and 29
signaled a sensitivity to the concerns of both universalists and
territorialists alike, implicitly legitimizing each. This cued enacting
states that the Model Law was thus a middle ground that all should be
able to agree upon. This non-threatening presentation permitted the tagalong injection of some proto-universalist provisions to be accepted by
territorialists, who doubtless would have balked at a more aggressive
presence of universalism. Accordingly, the gentle incrementalism
regarding indirect, non-core areas of the law likely assuaged some
hesitant, territorialism-inclined states skeptical about universalism’s
benefits, and perhaps even tricked (to their paternalistic betterment)
some troglodyte states prejudiced against universalism altogether.225

C.

The “Procedural” Character of the Model Law

Building upon the contentions of the previous subsection, I want to
refine the account of the Model Law’s success. My further claim is that
the Model Law’s incrementalist nudge toward universalism was not just
randomly situated in tangential areas of the Law unrelated to its core
provisions, but rather that it was deliberately directed at targeted
matters. The selection of those issues was influenced by the hoary legal
distinction between substance and procedure and its role in conflicts of
law theory.226
225. Professor Westbrook, a universalist instrumental in the drafting of the Model Law,
candidly acknowledged that the concession to territorialists embedded in Articles 28 and 29 was
the “sine qua non of achieving the Model Law.” Westbrook, supra note 8, at 17.
226. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, “At Least, to Do No Harm”: Does the Second
Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284, 1300 (1997)
(discussing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS chapter on “procedural” rules
and the general rule of conflicts jurisprudence to apply forum procedural law). Professor
Weintraub also discusses an outcome-determinative approach to defining procedure, whereby a
rule is truly procedural if does not rise to the level of affecting the choice of forum, and then
rescrutinizes the Restatement (Second) under this approach. Id. (citing Walter Wheeler Cook,
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 344 (1932)). See also Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468–74 (1965) (applying federal procedural rules in federal diversity
actions but applying state substantive laws). The precise definitions of and the distinctions
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When a true conflict of laws exists, co-equal sovereigns have
presumptively equal entitlement to exert their regulatory might.227 The
traditional approach is to resolve these conflicts with reference to a
content-neutral, jurisdiction-selecting rule, such as the Model Law’s
Article 2.228 More recent scholarship explores the idea of contentfocused inquiries based not on the jurisdictional clash, but on the policy
clash.229 In addition to weeding out false conflicts, such an approach
might generate a hierarchical ranking of policy interests. Needless to
say, these instances of consensus are not clearly delineated; Dean
Kramer of Stanford Law School proposes that they can at best be
shaped into canons rather than rules.230 One such canon, he submits,
rests upon the time-honored distinction between substance and
procedure.231 Kramer contends that if a conflict involves one state’s
procedural interests clashing with another’s substantive laws, the
community of sovereigns will generally agree that the substantive rule
should govern.232 Viewed another way, under this theory states should
between “substance” and “procedure” are not critical to this Article. For the reader insistent upon
an example, Dean Kramer defines procedural laws as ones chiefly aimed at regulating the conduct
of litigation, which explains the deference to a forum’s procedural laws in conflicts situations.
Dean Kramer’s definition implicitly (and likely correctly) assumes that procedure is more discrete
and identifiable, and leaves substance to be the definitional residuum. Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 324–26 (1990). While the precise definition may be
elusive, its entrenchment in conflicts jurisprudence cannot be seriously questioned. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934) (applying forum’s procedural laws
in conflicts situation); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL
PROCEDURE 1 (3d ed. 1985) (“Courts have many occasions to distinguish between substantive
law and procedure…. [O]ver-all definitions of the distinction would be both futile and
misleading.”). For a recent attempt that does not heed this advice, see Lawrence B. Solum,
Procedural Justice, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, No. 04-02, at pt. II., at http://ssrn.com/abstract=508282 (Feb. 23, 2004).
227. See Kramer, supra note 34, at 1019 (“The whole problem in a true conflict is that
different states have made different judgments about what is just, and it is axiomatic that…states
are coequal sovereigns entitled to make their own value judgments.”).
228. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 226 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 142–43 (1971)).
229. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 34, at 1015–21 (arguing for “policy-selecting” rules); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(3)
(1987) (comparing and ranking the interests of states with overlapping claims to prescriptive
jurisdiction).
230. Kramer, supra note 37, at 318–22 (explaining that such “canons” represent rules that
hypothetically negotiating sovereigns would agree to by compact, which at the very least must
leave them better off ex ante than application of forum law to a conflict).
231. Id. at 324.
232. Id. at 324–29. The application of this principle is somewhat confusing as notions of
“procedure” have evolved over time. Dean Kramer proposes following the “Erie” approach,
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be routinely more willing to cede regulatory authority on matters of
procedure than on matters of substance.233 Dean Kramer’s theory finds
some doctrinal support, for example in the U.S. federal court system’s
jurisdictional rules.234
Accordingly, the Model Law’s success may have stemmed from
exploiting the procedure–substance continuum on two different levels.
At a general, overarching level, the Model Law marketed itself, and was
in fact widely perceived, as a vehicle addressing chiefly “procedural”
matters. This likely assuaged hesitant states to let their guards down, or
at least err on the side of giving the law a chance.235 Any state diffusely
committed to showing some good faith at international cooperation in
insolvency law—but deeply hesitant to relinquish completely its more
substantive commitment to either universalism or territorialism—might
readily sign onto an international agreement like the Model Law
purporting to govern “mere procedure.” Additionally, at a secondary
level, the Model Law also employed the procedure–substance
which has federal procedural law govern in federal forum diversity cases when state substantive
law applies, unless the conflicting state “procedural” rule can be said to contain a substantive
purpose, in which case it will trump the federal rule. Id. at 327 & n.173 (collecting cases). Kramer
prefers this interpretation to the approach of some contemporary conflicts scholars that would
permit the forum law to govern in the event of hybrid substantive-procedural laws. Id. at 327–28.
The nuances are less relevant than the broader recognition of a procedure-substance distinction in
which states are more concerned with having their substantive policies enforced in a conflicts
situation than their procedural policies. Id. at 328. Other commentators agree. See Bergsten email,
supra note 87 (“You have emphasized the distinction between procedure and substance. I would
have to agree with you that countries are very tolerant of differences in procedure when it comes
to actions taken in another country.”).
233. It is important to be clear on the scope of this claim. States’ perceptions of procedure as
comparatively low-stakes matters should not be confused with the core notions of due process in
constitutional systems and natural justice in common law systems that are routinely concerned
with “procedural” protections. Issues such as notice, opportunity to be heard, and having an
impartial decision-maker are matters of critical importance to most legal systems and central in
deciding whether to defer to foreign judgments. See Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights, 102 B.R.
373 (D.N.J. 1988) (declining deference due to purported concerns with an ex parte order). These
procedural concerns are better characterized as “constitutional” matters, even though they pertain
to procedural issues. Few states readily defer on constitutional matters in conflicts. On the
contrary, they will likely hold constitutional issues to be of the highest legal order as matters of
“fundamental” policy. Cf. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 6 (allowing refusal of recognition of
foreign proceedings to protect violations of fundamental public policy).
234. Under American law, the Supreme Court of the United States may accord lesser
deference to the jurisdictional supremacy of a state court of final appeal’s pronouncement on state
law in the event that the state law at issue is one of procedure. This is the so-called “procedural
default” doctrine. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486–87 (1953).
235. Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 101, at 636 (“[Private legal reform bodies] react more
conservatively to proposals that would work significant reform than to proposals that alter the
status quo only slightly.”).
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distinction in selecting the specific areas in which to nudge its protouniversalism. That is, the provisions where the Law pushes its foray into
universalism, namely, Articles 14 and 31, are arguably both matters of
procedure, or at the very least, toward the procedural end of a
procedure-substance continuum. 236 It is on both this general and more
specific level that the Model Law sought to focus on matters of
procedure and thereby, following Dean Kramer’s theory, minimized the
likelihood it would be perceived as a substantial threat to sovereignty.
Yet again, this focus harkens back to the unique theoretical attributes of
bankruptcy laws that make them internationally challenging. The
procedural aspects (breadth and depth of reach) were pushed more
aggressively in the Model Law than the substantive aspects (differing
normative priorities of distributive justice). Moreover, those limited
areas where differing norms were confronted squarely, such as the
notice provisions of Article 14, were themselves procedural. This is why
I refer to the Model Law as a reform mechanism premised upon not just
“incrementalism” but “procedural incrementalism.”
The greater willingness of states to defer on matters of procedure did
not limit the Model Law’s import to fostering the acceptance of
outcome differences as such. To be sure, by signing onto the Model
Law, states took the first step toward subordinating their policies and
accepting outcome differences, albeit on comparatively minor matters in
the grand scheme of conflicts of law (procedure). But states’ comfort in
so doing also led them to accept the creation of a comparatively clear
choice-of-law rule, the second consequence of the Model Law’s focus
on procedure. Some scholars have suggested that the clarity of a choiceof-law rule to which sovereigns will submit correlates with the level of
commitment they are willing to make to the resulting decision.237 The
clearer the rule, the harder plausible deniability becomes for a state
seeking ex post defection.238 Because the perceived stakes of the Model
236. To return once again to the aquatic analogy of the previous subsection, the fact that the
matters were low stakes on which the hesitant territorialist states were acquiescing to testing the
waters of universalism makes it only a toe they were placing in the water; experimentation with a
higher stakes, more substantive bankruptcy provision, such as, for example, the avoidance rules
of a bankruptcy code, would be like testing the waters by dipping in one’s face.
237. See Guzman, supra note 200, at 309 (observing that in “high stakes” international issues
states are less likely to sign onto binding dispute resolution provisions).
238. Id. at 304 (predicting that a state’s willingness to sign on to a binding dispute resolution
clause in an international agreement will vary directly as a function of its inclination to honor the
implicated international commitment). Thus when states are inclined to comply, they are inclined
to box themselves into more on-record positions, such as a binding dispute resolution clause.
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Law were low, that is, because the areas on which the Model Law
would require some cession of sovereignty pertained to such procedural
matters as a presumption of insolvency, participating states became
willing to expose themselves to an unusually clear (at least by conflicts
standards)239 choice-of-law rule.240

When they want to be able to renege, they eschew such clauses and rely upon the vaguer forum of
the international community and reputational enforcement mechanisms. The extrapolation of this
principle to a choice of law rule would be that if states anticipate wanting to renege on the
outcome of a choice of law decision and not be bound by it, they would logically press for a
minimally clear rule that accords maximal possible evasion.
239. I say a “clear” choice of law rule to describe the “centre of main interests” test as aided
by the presumption of registered office in the Model Law, see MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts.
2(b), 16(3), because choice of law rules are traditionally amorphous. The reader need go no
further than the Restatement (Second) for an illustration. See also Tung, supra note 64, at 32–33
(characterizing choice of law rules as “notoriously imprecise and indeterminate”). O’Hara &
Ribstein, supra note 66, attribute this phenomenon to the desire of courts to leave themselves
escape room for the application of domestic law when they find foreign law substantively
objectionable, which accounts for the rejection of the rule-based approach of the Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws in the Restatement (Second), where “choice-of-law ‘rules’ are only
baseline presumptions that courts can ignore if a multifactored, contact-based analysis indicates
that another state’s law most appropriately applies.” Id. at 1183; see also id. at 1182 (“Although
judges began with a rule-based approach that might have deterred them from indulging in their
own preferences by making departures more obvious, the courts have developed more openended, standard-based approaches that facilitate more discretionary judicial decisionmaking.”).
240. For a healthy disagreement on this conclusion, see Tung, supra note 27, at 70–82. Tung
denigrates what he contends is the fuzzy, standard-oriented nature of the “centre of main
interests” rule and decries its ex post reliance upon judicial interpretation. He marshals support
from Professor Fletcher’s comments that the EU Regulation’s center of main interests test, even
with its rebuttable presumption of registered office, did not delineate the manner of rebutting this
presumption or the degree of proof needed. See id. at 77 (quoting IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 253 n.21, 260
(1999)). Professor Fletcher has subsequently written on how European courts have quickly
decided litigation involving this standard since the Regulation’s coming into force and generated
holdings for other states to follow, focusing upon the principle of reasonable expectations in
commercial settings and objective identifiability to third parties (including, interestingly,
instances where the presumption of registered office has been rebutted, such as in BRAC and
Enron). See Re BRAC Rent-A-Car Inc., [2003] 2 All E.R. 201, 207–08 (Ch. App.); Enron Directo
SL ((High Ct. Ch. Div., July 4, 2002) (oral decision of Lightman, J.) (holding that the Spainincorporated subsidiary of the Enron Group that had all its activities conducted and headquarters
situated at Enron House in London had its center of main interests in the United Kingdom rather
than Spain), discussed in Fletcher, supra note 179, at 11. While I agree in principle with Tung’s
concerns with fuzziness, I think he may be setting the bar too high; in my opinion, “centre of
main interests” seems no less manipulable than “principal place of business,” and that standard,
while to be sure triggering litigation at the margins, has enjoyed robust efficacy in American civil
procedure. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial
Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 882–84 (1998). See also Miguel Virgós &
Ettienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, EU Council Doc. 6500/96
DRS 8 (CFC) (May 3, 1996) [hereinafter Virgós-Schmit Report].
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As discussed above, one of the key developments of the Model Law
was the implementation of a choice-of-law rule. This was important for
settling on a unified international standard and reinforcing that one
country’s law should presumptively govern a cross-border bankruptcy.
What was equally if not more important was the Model Law’s setting in
which that rule was designed, because it contributed to the rule’s
content. By offering its choice-of-law rule in a seemingly low-stakes,
non-threatening vehicle, the Model Law was able not simply to
propound a rule qua rule, but also to make that rule comparatively
crisp.241 The choice-of-law rule in the Model Law is “centre of main
interests.” That rule was crafted to dictate the country that would enjoy,
among other legal consequences, the application of an automatic stay to
its debtors’ assets located in a recognizing jurisdiction, as well as a
presumption of the debtor’s insolvency. Had the Model Law, by
contrast, sought to entitle the selected jurisdiction to enjoy all
substantive control of the global bankruptcy, the choice-of-law rule
would almost certainly have slipped into a more malleable standard,
such as, for example, “the state with most appropriate contacts with the
dispute.”242 Indeed, the MIICA, which sought to effect complete
universalism, did not even contain a choice-of-law provision, consistent
with the proportionate relationship between substantive reach of an
instrument (stakes) and ambiguity of its choice-of-law rule (deniability).
241. More skeptical commentators disparage the choice of law rules suggested by
universalists in the literature. See Tung, supra note 64, at 31–33. The critiques of others are more
nuanced. For example, Wessels concedes the potential for mischief within a standard like center
of main interests but “nevertheless” contents himself that the courts seem to be working it out by
providing predictable guidance in their judicial interpretations. Wessels, supra note 82, at 25.
242. As an example of such indeterminacy in an international document, consider the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980), reprinted in U.S. Ratification of 1980
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Official English
Text, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6264–80 (Mar. 2, 1987) (based in part upon UNIDROIT’s Uniform Law
on the International Sale of Goods) [hereinafter CISG]. An ambitious agreement seeking to spell
out substantive rules for contracts borrowed from Article 2 of the American Uniform Commercial
Code and the domestic sales laws of other countries (and one that has received impressive
international adoption, see Stephan, supra note 11, at 774), the convention applies only to “parties
[of signatory states] whose places of business are in different states.” Id., art. 1(1). But “place of
business” for a multinational that conducts “business” in multiple jurisdictions turns on the
business “which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance”—scarcely a
model of clarity. Id., art. 10. This is consistent with my thesis: the scope of the convention
pertains to a rich panoply of substantive rights and obligations that flow from an international
sales contract, which is a “higher stakes” matter than certain procedures used in bankruptcy—
hence the offsetting reduction in clarity of its choice of law rule.
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Moreover, if the choice-of-law rule proves not only clear but durable,
i.e., it blazes a path upon which future universalist reform efforts will
build, then the final, universalist result will end up having a much
clearer anchoring rule than would have otherwise resulted by using a
one-step reform mechanism.243
Therefore, some insights from modern conflicts literature suggest that
in an area where international disagreement abounds and where states
hold high normative stakes, such as international bankruptcy, sovereign
actors will more readily coalesce around areas such as procedure, where
they will more willingly cede their sovereignty. This conclusion builds
upon the argument that when a conflict exists between substance and
procedure, states would prefer to yield on procedure from an ex ante
perspective than yield on substance. Injecting this sovereign disposition
into the international insolvency realm, where states have been trying
for years to reach some form of agreement, then the success of the
Model Law at garnering support might be thus explained. By effectively
channeling a cooperative international impulse into the (universalist)
acceptance of cession of sovereignty on matters of procedure, the Model
Law produced an end product of seemingly modest scope but
profoundly important effect. In following an approach of procedural
incrementalism, the Model Law not only succeeded in winning
international support where other proposals failed, but also locked in a
relatively clear choice-of-law rule in the process.244
Some qualification is necessary. Strictly speaking, my overall
argument does not rest upon the categorization of Articles 14 and 31 (or
the Model Law for that matter) as “procedural.” That is, the primary
proposition borrowed in part from Dean Kramer’s conflicts theory—that
states will cede sovereignty more willingly on “lower stakes” matters—
simply requires branding Articles 14 and 31 as “low stakes.” Such a
243. Professor Stephan disagrees with my positive assessment of the Model Law’s potential
for clarity in a passing analysis, see Stephan, supra note 11, at 784–87, and instead suggests that
the Model Law counterproductively “decrease[s] the predictability of outcomes in international
bankruptcies,” id. at 785. His conclusion appears to rest upon a belief, asserted in greater depth by
territorialists such as LoPucki, see LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2225–39, that the bright line of the
situs rule (in the presence of lending covenants) offers greater clarity than universalism, at least as
implemented by the Model Law—a contention which universalists like Professor Westbrook have
already engaged. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2309.
244. The first step, moreover, is the hardest. Subsequent efforts that build upon the Model
Law, such as UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide, should have an easier time following an
already-blazed path. Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 101, at 636 n.82 (“Revisions of existing
statutes are seen as ‘technical’ exercises—correcting minor flaws or updating a statute” and are
thus more likely to advance passage of clear status-quo altering rules).
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case can be made. Although at one level, the gatekeeping nature of
insolvency status might seem to invoke high stakes (whether or not you
get into the bankruptcy system), it seems reasonable when comparing it
to, for example, the distribution and priority rules (who gets what of the
limited money in the bankruptcy pot once you are in), to call it a low, or
at least lower, stakes matter. Similarly, the notice provisions for
commencement of a case are surely not core provisions of a bankruptcy
code. Thus I could rest my argument on showing that these low stakes
matters allowed states to let their guards down and sign onto a
comparatively non-renegable choice-of-law rule without trying to
shoehorn them into a substance-procedure taxonomy.
Nevertheless, I do want to contend that these provisions, if stratified
along a substance-procedure continuum (assuming away the difficulty
of articulating the principles for distinguishing substance from
procedure), fall more to the procedural end of the spectrum. The reason
I take this further step is not because I find Dean Kramer’s theory
irrefutable, although I do find it accords with my own intuition, but
because, at least in bankruptcy, there is a preoccupation with procedure.
For example, there is a whole school of bankruptcy scholars who
believe that bankruptcy law is nothing more than a procedural device
for facilitating a collective action discussion.245 Indeed, one of the focal
points of many bankruptcy regimes—a moratorium on the individual
collection of payments—is fairly characterized as a matter of procedure:
the right to seek collection of a debt is not cancelled; the remedy of
vindicating that right is merely channeled into a group resolution.246
Moreover, the distinguishing components of a bankruptcy regime
outlined at the beginning of this Article in part revolve around the
jurisdictional reach of the bankruptcy laws and their preclusive and
invasive effects (breadth and depth of scope), which also can be called
matters of procedure.247 Therefore it is not surprising that a transnational
bankruptcy law, drafted by blue ribbon international bankruptcy
practitioners and scholars, might be anchored, if even at a subconscious

245. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 7–19.
246. See Adler, supra note 20, at 234 (breaking the concept of a bankruptcy claim into its two
component parts: a debt (substantive) and the right to collect on that debt (procedural, enjoined by
the moratorium)).
247. The third component, normative content of distributive provisions such as the priority
rules, is the area where the Model Law makes its most ginger inroads, consistent with the theory
that yielding on procedures is more palatable than yielding on substance for sovereigns.
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level, in a procedural-substantive mindset.248 Indeed, the Model Law has
repeatedly been described as a “procedural” reform project, and many
of its provisions, while not the focal point of this Article, pertain to
facilitating the procedures by which courts and parties can communicate
across different jurisdictions. Thus I am inclined to suggest, at least as a
first level of description, that the areas such as Articles 14 and 31 where
the Model Law pushes its tentative universalism are matters of
procedure, or, more precisely, toward the procedural end of a
procedure-substance continuum.
In summarizing the previous two subsections of this Article, I claim
that the Model Law employed a model of gentle incrementalism to
nudge some initial foray into universalism and allow acclimation by
otherwise territorially inclined states that would balk were universalism
proposed more aggressively. This was successful at garnering
international support, even among these territorialist jurisdictions,
because of the seemingly tangential nature of the areas on which
universalism was sought and the indirect and possibly “subsurface” way
in which that universalism was sought. This approach contrasted with
the all-or-nothing approach of a comprehensive regime of full-fledged
universalism that doomed previous international reform efforts.
Furthermore, the specific areas at which this incrementalism was
directed were situated toward the procedural end of a proceduresubstance continuum. By taking this approach of procedural
incrementalism, the drafters of the Model Law sought to capitalize upon
the theorized willingness of states to be more likely to accept outcome
differences on matters of procedure than on matters of substantive law.
This explains not only the specific areas where the Model Law pushes
universalism, but also the broader characterization of the Model Law as
a “modest” document that is concerned, on the whole, with “procedural
matters.” This heightened willingness to accept outcome differences on
matters of procedure likely explains the Model Law’s ability to
introduce some limited universalism notwithstanding ongoing
international disagreement. It also explains the Model Law’s
surprisingly clear choice-of-law rule, which was enacted with regard to
seemingly low stakes matters. Thus the Model Law, as a successful
mechanism of international bankruptcy reform, relies upon much more

248. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide lends further support for this point. See
UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7, ¶ 30 (“Notwithstanding the variety of
substantive issues that must be resolved, insolvency laws are highly procedural in nature.”).
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than its status as a model law. It builds on a procedurally focused mode
of graduated acclimation.

VI. DEPLOYING THE MODEL: ANALYZING SUBSEQUENT INSOLVENCY
REFORM
The above argument that the Model Law fosters pluralist
universalism by embracing its two conceptual cores (by adopting a
choice-of-law rule and by promoting the acceptance of at least some
outcome differences) and the model I offer to explain its success at
doing so (by pursuing incremental reform, along a discernable
procedural-substantive continuum) can each be tested by analyzing the
subsequent direction of transnational insolvency reform. First, if the
Model Law advances universalism by deploying a robust jurisdictionselecting choice-of-law rule, then we should expect to see the roll out of
that rule in subsequent reforms. Second, if the Model Law advances
universalism by fostering some cession of regulatory sovereignty and
concomitant acceptance of outcome differences, and if (as I assume and
discuss below) the acceptance of some outcome differences begets the
more ready acceptance of further outcome differences in a
“snowballing” effect, then we should expect an accelerating trend
toward the acceptance of outcome differences, and perhaps even a move
toward substantive harmonization. Finally, if the model propounded
above accurately describes the Model Law’s success, we might predict
the path of both these developments (the areas in which the center of
main interests test is being used and the areas in which there will be
increasing acceptance of outcome differences) to be matters sliding up
the procedural-substantive scale. Each of these hypotheses is supported
by at least some evidence.

A.

Center of Main Interests Test

Recent reform experiences around the world support the notion that
“centre of main interests” is catching on in the insolvency realm. The
EU Regulation on Insolvency (EU Regulation), which came into force
in 2002, uses the same test to determine the primary jurisdiction of an
intra-Union, cross-border insolvency.249 The EU Regulation is a kindred
249. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 494. Although the EU Regulation came into force in 2002
(after the Model Law), it was actually the resuscitation of an earlier convention that was initiated
well before the Model Law. So it might be fairer to say that the Model Law drew the center of
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spirit to the Model Law, although it adopts a secondary proceeding
approach along the lines of Articles 28 and 29.250 Similarly, the ALI’s
TIP, a compilation of general principles and of restatement summaries
of domestic insolvency laws of the three NAFTA countries, also uses
the center of main interests test.251 The UNIDROIT Cape Town
Convention Protocol on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment uses
center of main interests to trigger the choice of law regarding the
possessory rights of lessors or secured parties of collateral in the event
of bankruptcy.252 Center of main interests thus seems to be moving well
beyond the Model Law,253 and is finding explication in judicial
decisions and scholarly analyses.254
main interests tests from (what was to become) the EU Regulation rather than vice-versa. See
Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2. Accordingly, Professor Westbrook suggests the Regulation
template “heavily influenced” the Model Law. Id. at 3. Given the typical pace of international
legal reform, see Wessels, supra note 6, at 505–06 (“Given the complexity of the issues and the
diversities in countries’ insolvency laws, the development over a period of less than a decade is
quite remarkable.”), it might be even more accurate to consider these European and UNCITRAL
reforms as occurring roughly contemporaneously. (Parenthetically, it is quite clear that the ALI
TIP followed both these projects, and represents, in the words of Professor Westbrook, “the next
generation of reform,” so at least its sequencing is clear. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2.)
250. For a more detailed summary than space permits here, refer to Wessels, supra note 6, at
491–93. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explain in detail, but the secondary proceeding
approach of the EU Regulation is conceivably “worse” than the territorialism lurking in Articles
28 and 29. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 33–38. Indeed, Professor Tung disparages the EU
Regulation as “essentially a territorial system with universalist pretensions.” Tung, supra note 27,
at 77. Some European commentators disagree with this pessimism. See, e.g., Wessels, supra note
6, at 499 (“‘[M]odified territorialism’…in my opinion does not reflect the Regulation’s model”
and “[i]t is for this reason I use the description of ‘coordinated universalism.’”). I accord the
Europeans deference in characterizing their own laws.
251. The formation of the general principles in the ALI TIP was strongly consensus-driven,
with no principle included if there was a “significant division of opinion along national lines.”
Westbrook, supra note 8, at 32.
252. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters
Specific to Aircraft Equipment, adopted Nov. 11, 2001, § XI, available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2005).
253. It also arises in UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, and in
the WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, ¶¶ 180–81.
254. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 179 (summarizing recent case law discussing center of
main interests); Wessels, supra note 82, at 4–10. Although there are no official travaux
préparatoires to the EU Regulation, there is a quasi-official report, the Virgós-Schmit Report,
which was supporting documentation to the failed treaty. See Virgós-Schmit Report, supra note
240. The report found outlet by being partially codified in a long list of recitals that appears at the
beginning of the EU Regulation. Regarding center of main interest, Recital 13, originally from the
Virgós-Schmit report, provides some interpretive guidance: “The ‘centre of main interests’ should
correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular
basis and is therefore ascertainable to third parties.” Id. Courts implementing this new law have
relied upon this language. E.g., Re BRAC Rent-A-Car Inc., [2003] 2 All E.R. 201, 207–08 (Ch.).

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art36

68

Pottow:

2005]

A M ODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY

1003

What is even more interesting is the test’s robustness. There are at
least two levels on which center of main interests could have been
modified around the world. First, subsequent reform efforts might have
tinkered with the test itself. The rule could have elevated “place of
registered office” to a bright-line rule rather than a mere rebuttable
presumption. Indeed such a neutral jurisdiction-selecting rule has
precedent in Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code.255
Alternatively, subsequent efforts could have softened the rule, along the
lines of the amorphous standards found in the U.S. Restatement on the
Conflicts of Laws.256 Neither occurred. Consensus converged on center
of main interests as an appropriate choice-of-law rule with an
appropriate degree of specificity.257
Another way the center of main interests test might have been altered
would have been to translate it into “local speak.” For example, when
the United States adopted the Model Law, it could have converted
center of main interests into a more nationally recognizable standard,
such as “principal place of business.”258 This would have captured the
essence of center of main interests, but in a legal parlance more familiar
to American lawyers. Yet the Americans intentionally used the
“foreign” language of center of main interests to acclimate local
bankruptcy professionals to a different, international lexicon.259 Thus
center of main interests’ robustness seems to be well grounded, both in
ongoing international reforms and parallel domestic enactments.

B.

Acceptance of Outcome Differences

1.

Acceptance of Outcome Differences Begetting Further
Acceptance

A second extrapolation from my model posits that there should be an
increasing acceptance of outcome differences as the Model Law is
255. U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307 (1998) and commentary.
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6 (1971) (articulating a “most
significant contacts” test).
257. The center of main interests test has now become entrenched enough to lead Bob
Wessels to call it the “magic words.” Wessels, supra note 82, at 4. The path, thus blazed, perhaps
proved dependence-inducing.
258. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000).
259. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the Congressional hearings on the proposed
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the recommendation of a minority of commentators that
the committee use American phraseology, and the ultimate decision of the committee to track the
Model Law’s language verbatim).
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rolled out and the first instances of outcome difference are felt. But this
prediction itself rests upon a proposition that the initial acceptance of
outcome differences will beget the further acceptance of outcome
differences along an accelerating path. The support for this embedded
assumption is the intuition that what lies at the root of territorialist
states’ aversion to outcome differences is often nothing more than freefloating concerns of sovereignty and discomfort with foreign laws.260
If that is so, then the best solution for easing this distrust may be
simple exposure to foreign laws. The educational benefit of such
exposure has been well noted:
Perhaps the most important benefits of comparative law are
educational. It is true that many of these benefits can be
generated by looking only at foreign national systems:
experiencing the variety and contingency of law, learning
tolerance toward other legal cultures, critically looking back at
one’s own rules, and so forth. Here, exactly what other legal
system students are exposed to is actually of secondary
importance; what is crucial is that they step outside of their own
legal system at all.261
If what holds many states back from embracing universalism and its
acceptance of outcome differences is in part a fear of “different” foreign
law, then mere exposure to those different systems, and their potentials
for different outcomes, may desensitize insolvency participants and
prompt a more critical reexamination of the perceived evils of those
foreign laws. Recall that the Model Law’s administrative provisions
remove procedural barriers to communication between insolvency
tribunals in different countries.262 Consequently, judges (and litigants) in
260. Avi-Yonah, supra note 48, at n.22 (“Countries may object to having the law of another
country apply within their territory as a matter of sovereignty, even if they agree with the policy
of the law in question.”).
261. Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the International
Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2001). See also Mooney, supra note 48, at n.106
(While I cannot prove it, my participation in and observations of the process of
negotiation and debate convinced me that the only reason for the objections to including
the substance of Alternative A alone as a choice for a Contracting State is that
Alternative A follows closely United States law—section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Having witnessed the Convention and Protocol being modeled on the substance and
policies of U.C.C. Article 9 and the Canadian personal property security acts, perhaps
borrowing from United States bankruptcy law was simply ‘too much’ for the objecting
states.).
262. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 25. Indeed, facilitating discussion should in and of itself
reduce the collective action problem that some contend is the main reason for an insolvency
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cross-border proceedings will now be able to interact more directly and
easily than ever before.263 The dynamic reassessment of domestic
bankruptcy laws by states under such a regime may well make
territorially disposed states less nervous about foreign bankruptcy law
and more amenable to the acceptance of outcome differences.264
Moreover, because the defining theoretical attributes of a bankruptcy
regime (broad, invasive reach of jurisdiction involving redistributive
norms) lend themselves to a noisy international environment of
conflicting and overlapping claims, the Model Law’s facilitation of
judicial dialogue may well reduce the noise and create situations where
orderly communication can find more common ground than initially
anticipated. Accordingly, it seems plausible that the initial acceptance of
outcome differences will in turn beget the further acceptance of
outcome differences.265
system in the first place. The EU Regulation actually imposes an affirmative “duty to cooperate,”
although the duty is directed at bankruptcy representatives rather than courts themselves. See
Wessels, supra note 6, at 493; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Duty to Seek Cooperation
in Multinational Insolvency Cases, ANNUAL REV. OF INSOLV. L., 187 (2005) (arguing for an
affirmative duty on courts to cooperate “actively” in multinational insolvencies with proceedings
in multiple countries).
263. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1113–14
(2000) (discussing the increased cross-border “dialogue” of appellate courts with their
international peers). Professor Westbrook has already noted the significant challenges on matters
as simple as using a common lexicon. Westbrook, supra note 105, at 567–68 (explaining the need
for exposure to both foreign terms and foreign constructs of insolvency law, such as the American
notion of a “debtor-in-possession” who may act within the “ordinary course of business”) (citing
11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c), 1107).
264. An illustration of this phenomenon might be in the alteration of domestic notice
requirements in the wake of the Model Law. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 505 (“This Model Law
aims to urge and inspire in a way to adapt the national insolvency law.”). Cf. Colloquy, supra note
2, at 2274 (“Indeed, to the extent that the different laws are just different attempts to reach the
same goals, countries could learn from the experiences of other nations and update their law
accordingly.”).
265. One of the recurring concerns of transnational insolvency is the information costs of
gaining familiarity with different countries’ laws. The participants in the ongoing debate differ
sharply in their assessments. Colloquy, supra note 2, at 2261–62 (“The largest potential cost is
getting a handle on the law of the country selected [under a contractarian approach to
transnational insolvency].”). Professor Rasmussen might be troubled at the point made in the
text—that the Model Law would promote and perhaps require exposure to multiple states’ laws—
given his prediction that a menu approach would more efficiently sharpen the international focus
onto understanding the laws of only a few. Id. But the point I wish to make is that the Model Law
is helpful as a stepping stone to a future adoption of universalism. It promotes exposure to foreign
laws even in the non-universalist parallel proceedings, which will make the eventual jump to fullfledged universalism at a future time less costly, when legal education becomes a sort of sunk
cost. Put another way, I suppose I anticipate the direct and indirect benefits from a robust
comparison of laws outweighing the costs of learning those laws.
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Evidence of Increased Acceptance of Outcome Differences and
Harmonization

The evidence for an increased acceptance of outcome differences is
harder to unearth than for the rollout of center of main interests. One
illustration would be a rise in deference to foreign insolvencies under
the Model Law than under pre-existing regimes such as Section 304(c)
of the U.S. Code, but the domestic enactment of the Model Law is not
yet widespread enough to test this. On the other hand, the EU
Regulation, which is premised upon the same spirit as the Model Law,
shows some promising trends in jurisdictional deference. In one early
case decided under the Regulation (which only came into force in
2002), Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd.,266 the High Court in the United Kingdom
opened a main insolvency proceeding, finding that it was the center of
main interests not only of the English debtor, but also of its French and
German-incorporated subsidiaries.267 This decision, in effect, rebutted
the presumption of center of main interests being the country of
registered office of the subsidiaries. The French trial court, as did the
German analogue, disavowed this jurisdictional conclusion and opened
a rival main proceeding for the French subsidiary, chafing at what it felt
was the British court’s aggrandizement of jurisdiction.268 But the
Appeals Court in Versailles reversed, clarifying that in international
bankruptcies under the EU Regulation, cooperation is required and
courts should not second-guess a prior court’s determination of center of
main interests.269 To be sure, this evidence is at best correlational rather
than causal regarding the role of the Model Law, but it is at least
For a debate on the information costs of territorialism for lenders setting the price of credit,
compare Guzman, supra note 25, at 2200–01 (predicting higher information costs under
territorialism due to lenders’ needs to understand multiple bankruptcy laws, not just the law of the
debtor’s home jurisdiction) with LoPucki, supra note 3, at 754 (challenging both the extent to
which lenders need to incorporate insolvency law into pricing credit and the conclusion that
territorialism will be more costly).
266. [Claim Nos. 861–76 of 2003], [2003] B.C.C. 562 (High Court of Justice (Ch. D.), Leeds,
May 16, 2003).
267. For a detailed discussion, see Wessels, supra note 82, at 20–22.
268. See Trib. comm. pont., May 26, 2003, Cass. com.
269. See CA Versailles, 24eme ch., Sep. 4, 2003, arret no. 12, available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european_union/Daisytek_CA_Versailles.pdf (last visited Nov.
6, 2005). The French public prosecutor has appealed this decision to the French Supreme Court
(Cour de cassation) on the grounds of public policy. This apparently was a violation of the
Principle of Mutual Trust, a European cognate of full faith and credit with regard to jurisdictional
decisions. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 503 n.39. For another European discussion—critical of
the Daisytek outcome—see Christoph G. Paulus, Zustandigkeitsfragen nach der Europeishcen
Insolvenzverordnung (working paper and English abstract on file with author).
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consistent with the theoretical predictions of greater acceptance of
foreign deference and cooperation in cross-border bankruptcy. Because
at this nascent stage empirical claims are at best speculative, I present
anecdotally the observation from conversations with European
colleagues that a decade ago a French court would likely find it
“unthinkable” that an English corporate affiliate could lead to the
application of British insolvency law of an otherwise “French” debtor.
What might demonstrate further acceptance of outcome differences
more strikingly would be if international harmonization were shown to
be on the rise after the Model Law. Again, there is some tentative
evidence here that is consistent with further movement building upon
the Model Law’s base. The first development is UNCITRAL’s Draft
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.270 This enormous document,
building on an earlier effort of the World Bank,271 is an ambitious
attempt to set out summaries and principles of domestic insolvency
regimes, and it contains broad, standards-based recommendations for
best practices for domestic bankruptcy codes. Multiple years in the
drafting, the final text was adopted by UNCITRAL’s Working Group in
2004.272 To be sure, many difficult questions are avoided in this
document, but the distillation of general principles arguably begins the
road to harmonization.273
270. UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7.
271. See WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 26.
272. U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY
LAW (2004). The document is divided into two parts. Part One is a sort of preamble that
propounds the “Key Objectives and Structure of an Effective and Efficient Insolvency Law.” Part
Two breaks out those specific provisions and employs a tripartite structure: a survey of various
approaches to the insolvency issue discussed; a recommendation based on those experiences; and
contents of a model legislative provision to implement those recommendations. The
recommendations are mostly soft. See, e.g., id. at 198 (“The law should protect a general right of
set-off existing under general law that arose prior to the commencement of insolvency
proceedings, subject to the application of avoidance provisions.”). On the other hand, and further
supporting my model, the document gets specific on more technical (and arguably procedural
matters), such as voting methods in reorganization proceedings. See, e.g., id. at 277:
To facilitate voting and recognize the increasing use of electronic means of
communication, it may be desirable to permit voting to take place in person, by proxy
and by electronic means. The majority should be calculated by reference to those
actually voting, whether in person, by proxy or by other means.
Interestingly, the publication of the Draft Legislative Guide in September 2003 had to omit the
choice of law recommendations, which came in January 2004. These recommended choice of law
rules are messy, but struggle toward endorsing a form of universalism. See, e.g., id. at 89
(assuming that the center of main interests test would presumptively determine controlling
insolvency law under rule of lex fori concursus in crafting regulated financial markets exception).
273. Building upon the reform of the EU Regulation, an apparently self-appointed “Working
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A second indication toward harmonization is the focus on
diminishing the special priority provisions that accord distributional
preference. With each insolvency regime having its idiosyncratic
provisions of special creditors who get paid ahead of the rank and file
(the United States boasts no fewer than seventeen types of them),274 the
number of friction points between nations is high. Yet a trend is
emerging toward downplaying these priorities. UNCITRAL’s
Legislative Guide begrudgingly countenances these domestic priorities,
mindful of the normative, country-specific policies they embrace, but
then admonishes countries to reduce reliance on them as much as
possible.275 And this call for diminution has been heard. In the 2002
revisions to the United Kingdom’s Enterprise Act, there was an express
reduction in the number of priority creditors in bankruptcy.276 The
elimination and reduction of priority provisions for special creditors
provides fewer points for sovereigns to fight about when comparing the
varying potential dispositions of a bankruptcy. With fewer areas on
which the outcomes can differ, the fewer incidences there will be in
which a state is called upon to cede regulatory sovereignty in an
outcome-determinative manner. Thus there is preliminary evidence to
indicate that the Model Law is correlated (and possibly causally
connected) with an increase in the acceptance of outcome differences in
bankruptcy.277
Group on European Insolvency Law” presented “Principles of European Insolvency Law,” in
Brussels in 2003. This document is a collection of fourteen principles purporting to cull general
trends of European substantive insolvency law. The Working Group has also followed the ALI
TIP model and prepared summaries of domestic insolvency law of ten of the EU member states.
See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY LAW (Bob Wessels ed.), available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european_union/PEILABIjournal_appended.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2005).
274. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000).
275. See U.N. Comm. On Int’l Trade Law, Draft Legislative Guide On Insolvency Law ¶ 628,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.70 (2004) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide
(2004)] (“The provision of priority rights has the potential to foster unproductive debate on the
assessment of which creditors should be afforded priority and the justifications for doing so.”).
Nevertheless, the Draft Legislative Guide concedes cryptically that there may be a “need to strike
a balance between private rights and public interests,” in creating priority provisions, id. ¶ 631,
and ultimately recommends that a bankruptcy law should “minimize priorities” and “set out
clearly the claims” that will receive that priority, id. at 237. The World Bank is more forgiving
and recognizes that countries may wish to accord priority status to employees to “ensur[e]
employee security,” WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, ¶ 148, perhaps mindful of a
different audience base.
276. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Year in Review, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22
(Dec/Jan 2004/2005) (discussing abolition of priority for governmental claims).
277. What is also interesting is the difficulty at cabining areas of bankruptcy once
international cooperation has begun. For example, although the EU Regulation thought it “best to
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Vector of Reform

As modeled above, the incrementalist path to transnational
insolvency reform suggests that the areas on which sovereigns will be
asked to yield will proceed from perceived lower-stakes matters to
higher-stakes matters. This may move along a spectrum from moreprocedural provisions to more-substantive provisions. Some subsequent
efforts to the Model Law appear to fit this trend.278
Recall that Article 14 of the Model Law forced some acceptance of
outcome difference regarding the standard and content of international
notice.279 In bankruptcy, notice likely falls at the procedural end of a
spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum are the meatier provisions,
such as the priority rules. Searching for a middle ground between these
two elements of a bankruptcy law, one might consider the stay. The stay
that operates at the outset of a case within many systems provides what
conceivably is a “middle stakes” provision. On the one hand, a
bankruptcy stay is simply a procedural order temporarily enjoining
other actions.280 On the other hand, the halting of individual collections
is critical;281 it forces joint resolution of the collective action problem
that many contend is the theoretical anchor of a bankruptcy system.282
So it might be fair to consider the bankruptcy stay as “procedure plus”
when placed upon a procedural-substantive continuum.
Using the model of procedural incrementalism, we would be
unsurprised if the next domain of sovereignty cession in bankruptcy
came on matters of the stay. Recall that the Model Law already requires
a recognizing state to impose a stay upon recognition of a foreign main
bankruptcy proceeding; this stay operates coextensively with the stay, if
any, that is imposed under domestic insolvency law.283 The ALI’s TIP,
postpone” the difficult issue of corporate groups, that matter became inevitable as cases had to
make decisions over center of main interests in corporate bankruptcies. Wessels, supra note 82, at
18.
278. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a cursory review of UNCITRAL’s Draft
Legislative Guide reveals greater specificity on more technical, procedural matters (such as
majority-vote calculation rules) than on other, more substantive provisions (such as avoidance
rules), consistent with my model. See generally UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide (2004),
supra note 275.
279. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 14.
280. The ALI TIP places matters of stays under the heading “Procedural Principles.” See ALI
TIP, supra note 8, Procedural Principles 4–6; see also Adler, supra note 20, at 235–36.
281. See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 80, at 333.
282. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 7–19.
283. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 20(1). Strictly speaking, this is perhaps not so much
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expressly noting its incremental extension of the Model Law,284 and also
employing the packaging of procedure,285 goes a step further. It suggests
that the NAFTA countries modify their domestic bankruptcy laws
beyond the provisions of the Model Law to provide for the imposition
of the domestic law stay to be automatic upon the filing of a foreign
proceeding in a NAFTA country, rather than first requiring the
recognition of that foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding by
a domestic court.286 Thus the ALI TIP pushes universalism even further
than the Model Law, and does so, incrementally, with the stay.
A more striking acceptance of outcome differences would be to force
the domestic state’s courts to accord the automatic stay not simply a coextensive scope with domestic law, as it does under the Model Law, but
the scope a stay would receive under the foreign state’s laws. At the
extreme, this might force an “anti-stay” jurisdiction,287 to enter a stay
upon the recognition of a foreign main proceeding from a “pro-stay”
jurisdiction.288 This appears to be the step taken by the EU Regulation,
and thus moves universalism a notch even further.289 Accordingly, it
does seem that other reform efforts are building upon the Model Law’s
foundation and moving, incrementally, along what could well be a
procedural continuum.290
an acceptance of outcome differences as it is an acceptance of the de facto foreign exercise of
domestic legal authority, which is a related if perhaps lesser sovereign concession.
284. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, Recommendation 2: Automatic Stay & cmt. (“This
recommendation again follows the Model Law, but goes further.”).
285. See id. at 35, General Principle II (“This Project is primarily devoted to procedural
questions.”).
286. See id., rec. 2 & cmt. (“It would mean that if the center of a debtor’s main interests is in
a NAFTA country, a bankruptcy filing in that country would produce a moratorium in all three
countries immediately and automatically without any need for court action in the first instance.”).
287. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 705; see also Bufford & Yanagida, supra note 42
(noting that under certain Japanese procedures pre-petition employee claims are not stayed).
Possibly because of this extreme stance, Japan scaled back Article 20 in enacting the Model Law
and restricted the scope of the automatic stay to enter upon recognition of a foreign main
proceeding. See Leonard, supra note 276, at 22 (discussing domestic enactments). On the other
hand, Japan’s recent revision to its Corporate Reorganization Law institutes some stay-like
restraints on creditors in a reorganization. See id; see also Bufford & Yanagida, supra note 42.
288. See 11 U.S.C. § 363. Indeed, this seems not that much more conceptually disharmonious
than Article 31’s imposition of a presumption of insolvency by recognition of a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding that has no insolvency screen.
289. The EU Regulation’s convoluted secondary proceedings approach makes its overall “net
universalism” vis-à-vis the Model Law’s difficult to measure. Also, as discussed above in note
251 and accompanying text, the overlap between the EU Regulation and the Model Law is
somewhat untidy from a chronological perspective.
290. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide gets a bit bolder in pushing for harmonization
with regard to stays, suggesting that they comport with the key objectives of bankruptcy systems
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VII. CONCLUSION
Debate in commercial law has been proceeding as rapidly as
international economic integration. High-profile collapses from
Parmalat to Yukos have attracted increased focus to international
financial default. Yet the field of transnational insolvency has
remained—at least until the past few years—stubbornly resistant to
reform.291
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency shattered
that stalemate and received widespread enthusiastic reception. Indeed, it
has just become Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, it
presented a puzzle: why was this mechanism of reform able to succeed
in the face of such past failure? What unique theoretical characteristics
of bankruptcy law did it tap into? This Article proposed a model of how
the Model Law was able to win international acceptance even in the
absence of theoretical and political consensus of how best to design a
transnational insolvency regime. It argued that the Model Law’s success
lay in the need for incremental reform in bankruptcy, reform that allows
sovereignty-sensitive states to acclimate to the extraterritorial reach of
foreign laws. It further proposed that that success may in turn have
relied upon the ability of the drafters to capitalize on the muchdiscussed distinction between substance and procedure in conflicts
theory—a distinction that some scholars contend is canonical to the
thorny challenges of international conflicts. Such appreciation and
exploitation provided the key both to developing a workable choice-oflaw rule and to fostering among sovereigns the acceptance of outcome
differences in international bankruptcies, the two theoretical foundations
of the universalist paradigm.
and that they should even apply to secured creditors (which is not true in many jurisdictions),
although the Guide then adds, with unusual specificity, that secured creditor stays should be short,
perhaps between 30 to 60 days. See Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, at rec. 37(c)
& n.52. Another example of moving up the procedural spectrum might be the doctrine of
substantive consolidation, which is a cousin of piercing the corporate veil and permits the
collapsing of independent corporate entities of an affiliated conglomerate into one bankruptcy
proceeding. See, e.g., Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 762 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“A substantive consolidation seriously affects the substantive rights of the involved parties. The
bankruptcy rules recognize as much.”). The various Daisytek decisions under the EU Regulation
have indirectly begun to articulate a European standard for this doctrine. See Wessels, supra note
82, at 20.
291. Academics have been calling for reform for quite some time. See, e.g., John Lowell,
Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV. 259, 264 (1888)
(advocating universalism).
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There is (at least) one serious concern one could have with my
model. One could agree with all that I have said regarding the nature of
incremental mechanisms of legal reform but then quarrel with the
implicit conclusion that such reform in bankruptcy is part of a multistaged journey from “proto” to “full” universalism. That is, one could
have reservations about the momentum of this trajectory. Reform might
stall in a position where it cannot proceed further.
This concern is not without merit. Indeed, if my model is premised
upon states starting with low stakes matters on which it is comparatively
easy to garner international support and then moving up a continuum
toward more substantive matters, it might well be that as the cession of
sovereignty gets increasingly painful, states will reach a balking point.292
If this is so, then the full “reform” of a pluralist universalist regime may
never come to fruition. Indeed, in a worst-case scenario, a Frankenstein
interim regime might entrench a new status quo that is less efficient and
desirable than might have otherwise been obtained under naked
territorialism.293
I am not as yet so despondent. The principal reason for optimism
stems from the discussion above pertaining to the increased acceptance
of outcome differences fostered by the Model Law and its progeny.294
The danger of reform stalling depends upon how willing states will be
to countenance the increasing invasion of foreign bankruptcy laws on
proceedings arguably within their sovereign jurisdiction.295 As discussed
above, those are unlikely to be static preferences, because the mere
exposure itself to foreign systems may have a positive influence on
states’ perceptions of the undesirability of ceding to other states’

292. Conceivably, this is what happened with Japan’s modification of article 20 to scale back
the universalist presumption of an automatic stay in accordance with the home state’s laws. Japan
is an anti-stay jurisdiction and has a long tradition of territorialism.
293. A bankruptcy regime’s theoretical reliance upon a market-symmetric scope can be
distorted by unpredictable stays based on differing controlling jurisdictions.
294. There will also always be academic pressure. See Mooney, supra note 193, at 204
(“Useful as harmonization efforts concerning procedural aspects of insolvency law for
multinational debtors may prove, perhaps it is time to step up efforts to modernize and harmonize
the substantive law….”). Interestingly, the first step Professor Mooney proposes to facilitate this
harmonization in the secured transactions context is to begin with requiring an international
public registry of security interests, i.e., a system of publicizing notice of security interests—
arguably a procedural starting point.
295. Cf. Michael Schroeder, New Role for SEC: Policing Companies Beyond U.S. Borders,
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2004, at A1 (detailing foreign securities agencies’ enthusiasm over the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws and deployment of SEC enforcement
resources).
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bankruptcy laws.296 Moreover, participants of a transnational bankruptcy
regime will grow increasingly versed in foreign states’ laws, with
British lawyers becoming conversant with “section 363 hearings” and
Americans talking about “administrators” and “floating charges,”
making those foreign laws ultimately less threatening. More
importantly, both users will start to talk about the “center of main
interests” of a corporate bankrupt.297 In short, I suspect nothing will
succeed like success itself and that the pace of reform will only
quicken.298
There are also at least two directions for future research that require
mention. First, the model presented here for reform is not meant to be
exclusive. There may be parallel mechanisms of international reform
operating in concert with procedural incrementalism. One interesting
possibility is substantively animated incrementalism. Under such an
approach, commercial reformers might try to carve out a discrete area of
insolvency regulation and propose a complete, comprehensive set of
priority rights. Such an approach could still follow an incrementalist
path, beginning with, say, multi-story commercial office buildings, then
all commercial real estate, then all real estate, and so forth. And there is
some evidence of this other road, such as the Cape Town Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Protocol thereto on
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment.299 In these documents, a highly
296. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide seems premised precisely upon this sort of
dynamic model of exposure and harmonization in advocating the benefits of the Model Law. See
Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, ¶ 166 (“[A]s the differences between insolvency
laws increasingly narrow and greater convergence emerges, there are fewer reasons for
maintaining the territorial approach.”).
297. See Wessels, supra note 82, at 25 (advocating the creation of a database translating
European caselaw interpreting the EU Regulation and arguing that such a device will further the
goal of harmonization).
298. More generally, as Dean Kramer has discussed, states also derive their own utility from
“diffuse reciprocity.” See Kramer, supra note 34, at 1026–27 (discussing the term “diffuse
reciprocity” coined by Robert Keohane in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER,
134–48 (1989) (Part II)). Diffuse reciprocity would fall under Kramer’s broader label of
“multistate policies.” See Kramer, supra note 37, at 313. It refers to situations where a rough
equivalence of interests will pull states toward cooperation by fostering mutual sacrifice and
commitment for a greater good. See Kramer, supra note 34, at 1027 (“Note also that diffuse
reciprocity alone will not generate cooperation. It is, rather, a force that comes into play when
other factors, like self-interest, create incentives to cooperate but the full benefits and costs of
doing so are not known with precision.”). Kramer predicts this cooperative impulse will be strong
in the commercial arena, which seeks to provide “a legal regime whose enforcement is uniform
and predictable.” Id. at 1016.
299. The convention and protocol were assembled by UNIDROIT. The convention was
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discrete area of commercial practice (the financing of aircraft) has been
carved out for some express harmonization. The draft convention spells
out the actual priority for secured liens on aircraft and their treatment in
bankruptcy.300 Rich ground for further analysis exists regarding the
interaction between such substantive carve-outs and procedural vehicles
such as the Model Law.
A second issue has to do with the role of institutions in designing
international law. The Model Law was the product of UNCITRAL, a
quasi-legislative international body. Yet other projects of even greater
ambition, such as the EU Regulation and the ALI TIP, operate at a
regional level, suggesting that even more fruitful paths for reformers lie
at the sub-global level. Intuitively, a smaller negotiating table surely
enables more meaningful consensus. Does this mean that bilateral
treaties, so popular in the cross-border taxation context, might provide
an example for future reform? What about the successful “model”
bilateral tax treaties promulgated by the OECD?301 On the other hand, it
seems like truly global institutions, such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, are always important. These international
institutions play key roles in insolvency law by cross-referencing their
own reform efforts and building upon the accelerating cooperative
impetus. Concluding its 1999 Report on “Orderly and Effective
Insolvency Procedures,” the IMF proposes that in the cross-border
context its objectives can be best met by “[t]he adoption by countries of
the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency prepared by
UNCITRAL.”302 Thus it seems that both regional and global institutions
can serve as cheerleaders, taskmasters, and catalysts to encourage and
opened for signature following a three-week diplomatic conference in Cape Town, South Africa
in October-November 2001 and stemmed from an original proposal to the Governing Council of
UNIDROIT by the Canadian government in 1988. See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The
Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Aircraft
Equipment Protocol: A New Era for Aircraft Financing, 18 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (2003).
300. Article 30(1) of the Convention provides that a security interest registered under the
international registry established under the Convention is to be “effective,” i.e., accorded priority,
in a subsequent insolvency proceeding. CAPE TOWN CONVENTION, supra note 190, art. 30(1). As
an interesting twist, certain procedural matters, such as the remedy to enforce a security interest
created under the Protocol, are left to the domestic laws of the enacting state. See id., art. 14. The
structure of the Convention seems to anticipate the addition of further protocols beyond aircraft
equipment. See id., arts. 2(2), 49 & 51. Indeed, UNIDROIT is already in the process of drafting
protocols for rail equipment and space equipment.
301. See OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, supra note 213.
302. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, LEGAL DEPARTMENT, ORDERLY & EFFECTIVE
INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES, KEY ISSUES 15 (1999) at 82, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
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assist countries in synchronizing their efforts to develop a coherent
international system. The interaction between these institutions and the
procedural mechanisms of bankruptcy reform would benefit from
further exploration.
Reform in transnational insolvency law—both in explicit crossborder legal regimes and domestic legal regimes that have international
reach—is exploding. Further efforts can be random and experimental,
creating a natural laboratory. Or they can proceed with an eye to critical
analysis of which mechanisms seem to work at securing positive
international reception, such as the Model Law, and to try to understand
why. Practitioners, regulators, and scholars will be well advised to
follow the latter path. This Article offers the model of procedural
incrementalism to assist them in their important task.303

303. Also beyond the scope of this Article but worthwhile of future inquiry is the potentially
unique nature of bankruptcy law within commercial law more generally. An initial distinguishing
characteristic that comes to mind is the compulsory nature of the law that is not currently
amenable to opt out through contractual arrangement, a point of some academic discussion
already. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 17–19. This may render it inappropriate for the
voluntary “private choice” of international jurisdictional competition advocated by some scholars.
See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 11, at 788–96; John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of
International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 577–87 (2003) (preferring
jurisdictional competition with an antidiscrimination rule to harmonization and the international
regulatory regime espoused by, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 400 (1997)). Thus whether bankruptcy law can even enter a
race, regardless of whether it is to the top or bottom, requires further discussion at another time.
For the impatient reader, consult LYNN M. LO PUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005) (chronicling
domestic and global trends in forum selection and purported “judicial competition” in
bankruptcy).
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